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ABSTRACT
reorganization of the executive branchOF THE GOVERNMENT OF PUERTO RICO-
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS AND LEGITIMACY
OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
SEPTEMBER 1996
MARIO ACOSTA VELEZ, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF PUERTO RICO
M.P.A., UNIVERSITY OF PUERTO RICO
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Jeffrey Sedgwick
The main purpose of the study is to provide an
understanding of the evolution of a legitimate executive
branch in Puerto Rico through the tool of executive
reorganization. This study looks at two reorganizations of
the executive branch (the first one initiated by Governor
Pedro Rosello in 1993) using the theoretical perspectives
that guided the evolution of the administrative state in
the United States: the Founders , view on executive
reorganization, the managerial perspective of the early
20th century, and the legitimacy perspective, which
broadens the Founders' concept of an energetic executive
and contests the managerial perspective's focus on
presidential supremacy.
The first two theoretical perspectives (the Founders'
and the managerial perspectives) shaped the way the
Governor's role in administration was formulated and
v
exercised in this century and guided the evolution of a
strong executive. However, this evolution created a basis
for the perceived illegitimacy of the administrative state.
This illegitimacy resides in an instrumental view of
public administration that confines the public
administration to be used as a mere instrument of the chief
executive and focuses on how to make the executive branch
more responsible and directly accountable to the Governor.
This study concludes that a new discourse is necessary
to bring a view of public administration as a collaborative
partner in the process of governance. This new discourse
has to embrace the legitimacy perspective to emphasize the
functions of administrative agencies as government
institutions in pursuit of the public interest. It must
also recognize the formal virtue of public administrators
as actors in the process of governance, and adopt the
concept of the public interest as the appropriate normative
basis for public administrators.
y
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INTRODUCTION
Executive reorganization has been a gubernatorial tool
during the 20th century to change the conception of
administrative authority in the political and
administrative systems in Puerto Rico and to elaborate on
the role of the governor in administration. This study
argues that executive reorganization is offered, in Puerto
Rico as in the United States, as a means to efficiency and
responsibility, but is in real measure an instrument of a
strengthened chief executive with heightened authority over
administration. In 1949, Luis Munoz-Marin, the first
elected Governor of Puerto Rico, used this tool to initiate
the modern governorship. For the first time, executive
reorganization constituted a successful effort to establish
an administrative state with centralization of substantial
managerial authority in the Governor as the chief
executive. This established a precedent for later
reorganizations. The most recent one, initiated by
Governor Pedro Rosello in 1993, provided continuity to the
enhancement of the managerial role of the Governor as chief
executive of the executive branch.
This study examines these two reorganizations using
the theoretical framework that guided the evolution of the
1
administrative state in the United States. The Founders'
insight on executive organization, the managerial
perspective of the early 20th Century, and the theory of
legitimacy of the administrative state are the theoretical
perspectives used in this study. I seek to understand how
these theoretical perspectives shaped the way the
Governor's role in administration was formulated and
exercised in this century. The fundamental questions are:
Does the reorganization movement that these theoretical
perspectives guided in the context of the United States
have any relation to executive reorganization in Puerto
Rico? And, do they relate to the success of the first
comprehensive reorganization of the executive branch in
1949?
The answers to these questions are essential to
acquire a basic understanding of executive reorganization
in Puerto Rico. Furthermore, understanding these
theoretical models and their dominant principles of
organization is a matter of great importance for examining
the practice of reorganization in Puerto Rico. Based on
this understanding, this study attempts to show that
reorganization of the executive branch of the Government of
Puerto Rico was based on an external model of executive
organization conducive to the evolution of a strong
2
executive. However, this evolution created a basis for the
perceived illegitimacy of the administrative state.
Executive reorganizations in Puerto Rico constitute in
many ways an interesting political and administrative
phenomena. The effect of both the Founders' conception of
a strong executive and the managerial perspective's focus
on executive supremacy on the evolution of the executive in
Puerto Rico has not been studied extensively. This makes
the practice of reorganization planning in Puerto Rico
worth studying because of its contribution to the evolution
of a strong governorship and its relationship to
administration
.
The paramount purpose of this study is to provide an
understanding of the evolution of a legitimate executive
branch in Puerto Rico through the tool of executive
reorganization. Why did reorganizations of the executive
branch occur in Puerto Rico? What form did the
administrative state take? What models did the
reorganizations follow? What conflicts or controversies
arose during the processes? Ultimately, which of these
reorganizations met the need of establishing the legitimacy
of the Executive Branch of the Government of Puerto Rico?
These questions are addressed by examining the
evidentiary work left behind by these reorganizations. The
3
empirical analysis relies on reports and recommendations,
government documents, press conferences and newspaper
articles. Since many of these sources were originally
written in Spanish, I translated them into English for
their reference in this study. In the case of the 1993
reorganization, for which many of the records are still
unaccessible to researchers, I have only had access to
limited empirical material for analysis. In addition, no
comprehensive studies of this reorganization have been
made
.
The format of this study consists of five chapters. In
chapter one, I examine three different theoretical
perspectives on the role of the chief executive in
administration that lay the framework for the empirical
analysis of the reorganizations in Puerto Rico. In chapter
two, I provide a summary of three federal reorganizations
that applied the general principles of organization
expressed by the Founders and the managerial perspective.
In chapter three, I focus on the first comprehensive
reorganization of the executive branch in Puerto Rico
initiated by Luis Munoz-Marin through the Rowe Commission
in 1949. This reorganization is treated as the founding of
the Puerto Rican Administrative State. In chapter four, I
discuss the most recent reorganization of the Executive
4
Branch of the Government of Puerto Rico, the New Beginning,
and compare it to the reorganization recommended by the
Rowe Commission. Finally, in chapter five, I present the
conclusions of this study and address its main research
questions
.
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CHAPTER I
THEORETICAL PRESPECTIVES ON THE ROLE OF THE
PRESIDENT AS CHIEF EXECUTIVE
This chapter examines three theoretical perspectives
on the role of the President as Chief Executive. First, it
examines the Founders' insight into executive organization.
Second, it discusses the classical emphasis on
presidential supremacy put forth in the managerial
perspective. Finally, it readdresses these two views on
executive organization using the perspective on legitimacy
of the Administrative State, the legitimacy perspective.
In this chapter, I propose three main notions. One is
that the Founders' normative view on executive organization
is expressed both in the creation of an energetic executive
with limited legislative interference in the business of
administration and in their concern for the values of unity
and responsibility as principles of executive organization.
The second one is that the managerial perspective, evident
during the period known as the Classical Approach to Public
Administration (the period of formation of self-conscious
American public administration theory) , justified a
president ially-controlled executive establishment that led
6
to an instrumental view of Public Administration. The
third notion is that the legitimacy perspective broadens
the Founders' concept of an energetic executive and
contests the managerial perspective's focus on presidential
supremacy
.
The founders on executive organization
The founders brought with them to the Federal
Convention in 1787 their experience with a weak executive.
This experience conditioned their orientation toward a
strong executive centered on the values of executive unity,
energy, and responsibility. To understand the founders'
view on the executive, a brief look at the state and
national experiences prior to the Constitution is in order.
Under most state constitutions, the executive was
inherently subordinate to the legislature (Thach, 1922).
This subordination was reflected in features such as short
terms, strict limitations on re-eligibility, and election
by the legislature. According to Thach, legislative
dominance also conditioned the executive's liberty of
action. The executive's use of power, for example, had to
be in accord with the advice of an executive council
chosen, save in Pennsylvania, by the Legislature. As Thach
7
states, subordination was further evidenced by "the common
practice of expressly submitting the exercise of either
certain enumerated powers, the field of enumerated powers,
or even the whole of the executive power to the legislative
will
" (p . 2 9 ) .
Through the state constitutions, the legislatures were
empowered to determine all matters concerning the
executive. They, by virtue of constitutional language that
placed priority in the power of making laws, were
considered the sovereign authority. As James Ceaser (1979)
has observed, "the pressure for a more direct expression of
the will of the people led to the rise of the popular
branch of the legislature as the supreme and unchecked
sovereign..." (p.48). The state legislatures, in Thach's
words, kept the executive departments "under close
supervision and control, interfered with them in their
constitutional spheres, dictated to them what they should
do by laws which they were unable to oppose" (p.34)
.
For
instance, Corwin (1984) notes, the Virginia constitution
stipulated that the exercise of the executive power was to
be in accordance with the law and that the executive could
not claim any prerogative by virtue of any law, statute, or
custom of England. The net effects were legislative
supremacy based "on the claim to immediate representation
8
of the popular will" (Ceaser
,
p.49 and the organization of
the executive "in such a fashion as to ensure a complete
subordination. And such
,
in general, was the process
followed" (p.27)
.
As a result, executive power was
diminished and the execution of the laws depended on the
legislature
.
Under the Articles of Confederation, a lack of
national formal executive power pointed to legislative
supremacy. As Theodore J. Lowi (1985) has observed,
"several executive departments were created, including
Foreign Affairs, War, Marine, and Treasury, but the heads
of these departments were obliged to report to Congress"
(p.31) . These departments, Richard Pious stated, "were
appendages of the legislature, not an executive branch"
(quoted in Lowi, p.31)
.
This condition shows that Congress
played the roles of both legislature and executive. The
consequence was a congressional inability to supply
continuous direction and coordination of administrative
agencies. In order to solve this problem, Kallenback
(1966) points out, Congress considered the partial
transformation of itself from an active administrator to
the enactor of administrative laws. Its role centered on
setting up permanent agencies, fixing their duties by
permanent rules, providing means for
9
controlling them in their activities, and determining their
relations to their creator.
Congress' acknowledgment of its inability to conduct
the business of administration initiated a trend toward a
real executive. As Leonard D. White (1948) argues in
The Federalists , this transformation embodied a
congressional acceptance of the superior position of the
executive in relation to departments. However, it did not
represent Congress' willingness to rid itself of
administrative details (Thach, 1922).
Congress ensured its influence over administration by
creating committees to carry out orders from itself. The
naval committee, for example, had the responsibility as
administrator of reporting measures for congressional
consideration. It also created the standing committee of
five to supervise the Treasury. These bodies had not only
to report on individual matters, but also on policies and
even administrative laws. In this way, Congress continued
to settle matters of minute detail on the floor, while
leaving to the administrative agency the ministerial duty
of carrying out each decision as it was reached.
Even this ministerial system raised doubts among the
founders as to its ability to provide a good
administration. Hamilton, for instance, claimed that
10
Congress was unable to act with sufficient decision or
system because of keeping too much power in its own hands
and interfering as to every detail of administration. The
system of boards, in his view, had the disadvantage of
being slower, having less energy, and diffusing
responsibility. He favored limiting Congress' function to
passing legislation, for it proved its inability to conduct
the business of administration. This position evidenced
Hamilton's tendency toward the value of executive
responsibility for administration as a quality of a good
government. As he said in Federalist 71, "It is one thing
to be subordinate to the laws, and another to be dependent
on the legislative body. The first comports with, the last
violates, the fundamental principles of good government"
( Federalist Papers
,
p.433).
We can infer that the state and national experiences
prior to the Constitution pointed to the functional
separation of powers as a solution to the problem of lack
of executive power. These experiences led the founders to
accept the assumption that the separation between Congress
and the Executive would not only provide a protection
against abusive power, but also produce governmental
efficiency. This set the basis for the founders' concern
11
on executive organization. Let us see how this concern was
expressed in the Philadelphia Convention.
In 1787, the Founders took a more favorable view of
executive power (Ceaser, 1979)
. As Corwin (1984)
suggested, a main concern for the delegates in the Federal
Convention was how to solve the problem of weak executive
power with regard to administration. To address this
challenge, the Framers of the Constitution agreed upon
establishing a national chief executive with the power of
overall superintendence of government operations
(Kallenback, 1966) . The term chief executive, in the
Founders' view, referred to the President's role of
guaranteeing the faithful execution of the laws and
maintaining an effective executive authority over the
administrative bureaucracy. As to establishing the role of
faithful execution of the laws, the Founders were reacting
to the problem of distribution of power as well as to the
bases of political authority prevalent in the state
governments. The Founders, states Ceaser, "saw the popular
assembly as a symptom of a reliance on popular authority"
(p . 49 ) .
This base of political authority was for the founders
an informal influence that represented a threat to
constitutional government. They looked to the President as
12
the embodiment of energy and statesmanship. According to
Ceaser, statesmanship, in the Founders' view, referred to
the ability to use personal judgement to distance oneself
from the immediate pressures of public opinion. The
President was, Ceaser says, "to reach beyond the partial
and selfish interest of any group within society and
consult the public interest as a whole" (p.50). Thus, the
Chief Executive was to be a strong executive capable of
restraining any excessive tendencies toward popular
authority
.
The Founders' emphasis on non-partisan election
supports this conception of a Chief Executive. The role of
the Chief Executive was to be non-popular, which meant
based on the formal character of its office. His power was
to rest on the legally defined prerogatives of the office
"in which the claim to rule was based on the constituted
authority of the institutions' (Ceaser, p.49). This
implies that the purpose of election was only to select the
president, not to arm him with authority beyond that
provided by the Constitution. One can say that the
Founders, by assigning the President the role of
guaranteeing the faithful execution of the laws, intended
to prevent the President "from becoming a popular favorite"
(Ceaser, p.51) They did not favor a president who was a
13
popular leader possessing a mandate, for this would lead to
favoring popular demands. Therefore, the purpose was to
secure that presidential authority "was not overwhelmed by
-*-^formal sxtraconstitut ional authority, by power based
on 'charisma' or assertions of representations of the
immediate popular will" (Ceaser, p.51).
The role of maintaining an effective executive
authority over the administrative bureaucracy presupposes
the framers' purpose of placing an energetic president at
the top of the executive structure. Clinton Rossiter
(1960) contends that the framers charged the President with
the duty of running the government to produce "good
administration." According to Rossiter, the framers
considered the President to be the person able to fulfill
this duty. This reflects the framers' aim at making the
President accountable for the conduct of administrative
affairs. The President, observes Rossiter, was to be
accountable for the efficiency of the national
administration. Thus, the framers' goal was to secure a
strong executive capable of guiding the executive
establishment they created and promoting responsibility and
efficiency to assure good government.
At the Constitutional Convention, The Founders
addressed several issues regarding the national executive.
14
Constitutional considerations included issues such as
execut ive - legi s la t ive separation, the number of the
executive, election of the executive, the executive's
salary, and the executive's administrative authority.
Relevant to the argument advanced in this study are the
issues of separation, number, and administrative authority.
The plans presented at the National Convention
constituted embodiments of the framers 1 views on executive
organization and the role of the President as Chief
Executive. The Virginia plan, the first presented at the
Convention by Edmund Randolph (but mostly written by James
Madison)
,
advocated for executive independence as a
necessary ingredient for the organization of the executive.
The number of the executive was undetermined, probably
because Randolph, the formal presenter of the plan, opposed
a unitary executive while Madison apparently favored it.
As Thach reasons, the executive, had this proposal been
approved, would have been a small .committee of states with
the responsibility of carrying out the laws. As a reaction
to the proposal, Wilson (from Pennsylvania), who "was the
strongest supporter of the strong executive" (Corwin,
p.ll), stated that there should be a single magistrate
characterized by energy, dispatch and responsibility
(Debates, June 1, p.46). He considered that the powers of
15
the executive were strictly those of executing the law and
appointing officers with the exception of those who were to
be appointed by the legislature under constitutional
provision. He moved then to amend the Randolph plan
promptly upon completion of Randolph's presentation.
Wilson's rejection of the plural executive thus relied on
his belief that it would undermine the principles of
executive accountability and responsibility.
The Paterson plan constituted a second view on
executive organization. Even though it retained the plural
executive, this plan reaffirmed the Virginia Plan's
emphasis on the executive as an organ completely separate
from the legislature. In terms of administrative
authority, the executive was to execute the federal acts,
appoint all federal officers not otherwise provided by the
Constitution, and direct all military operations. In
essence, it embodied the principle of separation of powers.
Hence, it favored an independent administrative executive
with control of military operations and appointments. The
Virginia and Paterson plans therefore intended to preclude
the exercise of both executive and legislative powers by
the same branch.
Hamilton's conception of the executive was stronger
than either those of Wilson or Paterson. His executive was
16
to have the sole appointment of the heads or chief officers
of the departments of Finance, War, and Foreign Affairs.
Hamilton s desire for a strong executive stemmed from his
conviction that the country suffered under the Articles of
Confederation from the lack of adequate executive power
(Corwin, 1985)
. For this reason, he favored a centralized
government without the weak executive that characterized
many of the states of the time (Caldwell, 1988) . In The
Federalist he wrote, "The true test of a good government is
its attempt and tendency to produce a good administration"
(quoted in Rossiter, p.19).
In The Administrative Theories of Hamilton and
Jefferson
,
Lynton K. Caldwell condensed Hamilton's views on
executive organization into a few principles. These
principles centered on the notion of strong executive
centralization. Caldwell identified energy as a core
principle in Hamilton's view of good government. In
Federalist 70, Hamilton asserted, "Energy in the executive
is a leading character in the definition of a good
government" ( Federalist Papers
,
p.423)
.
In the same
Federalist 70, he revealed his position in favor of an
energetic executive by stating: "A feeble executive
implies a feeble execution of the government. A feeble
17
execution is but another phrase for a bad
execution ..." (p . 423
)
.
Hamilton argued that four ingredients constituted the
source of executive energy. Unity he believed to be
conducive to energy. He concluded that unity in the
executive was indispensable for energetic administration.
A plural executive was a pernicious alternative for
Hamilton. As he said in Federalist 70, "Decision,
activity, secrecy, and dispatch will generally characterize
the proceedings of one man in a much more eminent degree
than the proceedings of any great number; and in proportion
as the number is increased, these qualities will be
diminished" ( Federalist Papers
, p.424). In this way, he
connected with Wilson's argument that a strong executive
should be a single magistrate characterized by energy.
Hamilton also considered duration as a necessary
requisite for energy in the Executive. He contended that
duration would provide the executive with personal firmness
in the employment of his constitutional powers and ensure
stability of the system of administration (Federalist 71).
A brief tenure would condemn a magistrate to feebleness and
irresolution in his administration. Duration, Hamilton
said, "is necessary to give the officer himself the
inclinations and the resolution to act his part well, and
18
to the community time and leisure to observe the tendency
of his measures, and thence to form an experimental
estimate of their merits" (Federalist 72, Federalist
Papers
, p . 436
)
.
Besides unity and duration, Hamilton considered
competent power as an important ingredient of energy.
According to Caldwell, Hamilton considered that "only a
powerful executive could be responsible for the promotion
of great interests" (p.28)
.
The importance of competent
power, in Hamilton's view characterized as a qualified
negative upon the acts and resolutions of the two houses of
the legislature, resided in that "it furnishes an
additional security against the enaction of improper laws.
Caldwell includes the principle of adequate provision for
support as closely related to competent powers . Support of
executive authority was for Hamilton essential to safeguard
the independence of the executive. As Hamilton contends,
without proper attention to the principle of adequate
support "the separation of the executive from the
legislative department would be merely nominal and
nugatory" (Federalist 73, Federalist Papers , p.441).
The last principle Caldwell identified as part of
Hamilton's view on executive organization was
19
Responsibility. This principle was for Hamilton an
essential ingredient for good administration. "While
Hamilton desired a strong executive, he also desired one
which was responsible,
" wrote White (1948) . Executive
responsibility was a requisite intended to encourage an
energetic performance of duties and restrain usurping
practices. Hamilton understood responsibility as "due
dependence on the people", including accountability of
administrators to the people through their representatives.
In a republican sense, "due dependence on the people" and
"due responsibility" were identified as the ingredients
which constitute safety. This emphasis on dependence as
"the safest guarantee of responsible conduct" (Caldwell,
p.30) reflected Hamilton's beleif that this "republican
principle demands that the deliberate sense of the
community should govern the conduct of those to whom they
intrust the management of their affairs; but it does not
require an unqualified complaisance to every sudden breeze
of passion, or to every transient impulse which the people
may receive from the arts of men" (Federalist 71,
Federalist Papers
.
p. 432)
.
The Pinckney plan, the final proposal to organize the
executive power, delineated the power of the president. In
conceptualizing the President as the executive authority of
20
the United States, this proposal vested the executive power
in the President, not in the Executive Branch. The
Executive was entitled to take care that the laws of the
United States be executed. He was also granted the
authority to appoint executive officers in order to assure
good administration.
The Pinckney plan portrayed the President as Chief
Executive with power to assure efficiency and
responsibility in the executive branch. As Thach noted,
"the President can use his power to check upon the
officers, keep them attentive to their duty, and may be the
means in time not only of preventing and correcting errors,
but also of detecting and punishing mal practice" (p. 109 ).
It can be inferred that the Pinckney plan foresaw the duty
of reorganization as executive and necessary whenever the
existing organization precludes executive efficiency.
The opposition to the proposed plans provided an
argument against unity, energy and independence as
principles of executive organization. Sherman, even though
he was not in opposition to a single executive, considered
the executive magistracy nothing more than an institution
for carrying the will of the Legislature into effect. This
was a conception of a weak executive that was supported by
other delegates. Randolph was against unity in the
21
executive
,
so he characterized it as the "foetus of
monarchy. This reflected his fear of a too-powerful
executive. Gorham rejected independence of the executive
and his re-eligibility (Debates
,
p.46)
.
It is clear that a
fear of monarchy led the leaders of the opposition to
strongly reject the propositions favoring a strong
executive. Nevertheless, their arguments proved
ineffective in precluding the establishment of the proposed
executive
.
It is important to note that the New York Constitution
influenced these constitutional plans. In reference to our
focus on executive authority over administration, this
constitution stipulated: "It shall be the duty of the
governor to inform the legislature at every session of the
condition of the state so far as may concern his
department; to recommend such matters to their
consideration as shall appear to him to concern its good
government; to transact all necessary business with the
officers of government; to take care that the laws are
faithfully executed to the best of his ability ...( Thach,
p.lll) . Therefore, this document represented an act to
institute the executive's authority to recommend and effect
changes in the administration in order to produce good
government
.
22
Article II of the finished Constitution reflects the
influence of the Pinckney plan in its creation. The first
sentence of this article states: "The Executive power
shall be vested in a President of the United Sates of
America
. In section B, it says that the President "shall
take care to the best of his ability that the laws be
faithfully executed." This language, which implicitly
reflects an emphasis on executive oversight, justifies the
role of the President as Chief Executive of the executive
branch
.
Although the delegates engaged in a debate regarding
how to organize the executive branch they were
establishing, the Constitution they approved is largely
silent regarding how the Executive Branch should be formed.
Provisions from the Morris-Pinckney Plan, submitted on
August 20th, about organization of the executive
departments were not included in the finished constitution
because department organization was considered a
legislative determination. Thus, the Constitution's
ambiguous language on organizational matters tends to belie
the framers' concern for principles of executive
organization (Moe & Gilmore, 1995) .
However, the fact that the Constitution is silent
regarding executive structure does not mean that it was not
23
a concern for its creators. The constitutional clause that
empowers the President to require written opinions from his
subordinates evidences the founders 1 conception of the
President as Chief Executive. A more important point is
that the framers elevated the President's position of
executive authority and initiative based on the formal
character of the office. Above all, they acknowledged the
capability of the President to ensure good administration
by virtue of his independence, unity, energy, and
responsibility. Good Government, in their view, was not
only efficient government but also one responsive to the
Constitution. In this sense, it was the president's role
to use his independence to restrain informal influences
that could represent a threat to constitutional government.
The Managerial Perspective
The managerial perspective, which is identified with
the traditional American public administration theory of
the early 20th century (known as the Classical Approach to
Public Administration), reaffirmed the founders' concern
for a strong executive with formal administrative
authority. As Dwight Waldo (1985) asserted in The
24
Administrative S t at
e
,
one of the major themes addressed
within the classical approach was centralization of
executive authority.
Here I use the term executive authority to refer to
centralization of substantial authority in the President as
manager of the executive branch. This is different from
the framers conception of the role of the President as
Chief Executive. While Chief Executive, in the framers'
sense, refers to the highest officer of the executive
branch with responsibility for its guidance and the
faithful execution of the laws, Chief Executive, in the
managerial sense, refers to a President who controls and
manages the executive branch. Although executive authority
under the managerial perspective embodies the Founders'
view of centralization, unification, and integration of
executive activities under the President, it includes a
notion of policy initiative in the Executive Branch,
legitimated by the President's electoral mandate.
The managerial perspective is a reflection of the
classical emphasis on executive centralization. It aims at
centralizing responsibility, strengthening the
administrative role of the President through a strong
hierarchical control within the executive branch, and
integrating executive agencies in the name of efficiency.
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Represented by what Bryan Fry (1989) identifies as the
Departamentalists
,
the managerial perspective puts emphasis
on executive authority by drawing attention towards
administrative management and structure. It reflects a
desire for enhancement of executive authority, which echoes
the intention of the framers of establishing a strong
executive. Like the founders' insight on executive
authority
,
it is a normative view on executive
organization
.
The managerial perspective, "underlying the
development of 20th century reorganization planning"
(Arnold, 1986, p.4), emphasizes a managerial role for the
President. It views comprehensive reorganization planning
as a function of the Chief Executive. It places the
executive branch under the authority of the Chief Executive
and defines good administration in terms of presidential
capacity to manage the executive branch. Thus, it carries
the contention that, in order to be efficient, government
must maintain a strong executive managerial capacity
(Arnold, p . 47
)
.
In this section, I focus on the work of Luther Gulick
as representative of the managerial perspective. His work
on government structure is central to the argument advanced
in this study. I use Gulick 's work because of its
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attention to structural reform and his prescription on
consolidation, integration, and rationalization of
executive activities as means to assure an efficient and
effective administration.
What identifies Gulick with the managerial perspective
is his strong emphasis on the enhancement of executive
power within the executive branch. His theory of
administrative reform prescribes unity and leadership as
requisites for effective administration and advocates for a
strong executive as necessary for the proper coordination
of government agencies.
Unification of executive activities implies the
development of mechanisms of coordination in the
organization. Gulick elaborates on the structure of
authority and shared ideas as two mechanisms of
coordination. Control and leadership are vital elements of
the structure of executive authority. Coordination through
control requires a single overall directing executive
authority, the provision of supervision for each job, and
the determination of the unit tasks into which the overall
job will have to be divided. Coordination through
leadership requires unity of the executive.
Under the structure of authority, the Executive is
assigned specific functions summed up in the acronym
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POSDCORB
. The letters of the acronym stand for the
functions of Planning, Organizing, Staffing, Directing,
Coordinating, Reporting, and Budgeting. This wide range of
functions supports the role of the President as the manager
of the executive branch. As Gulick (1937) writes, "In view
of the fact that the job of the president as Chief
Executive is POSDCORB, institutionalization must not be
allowed to take any one of these functions out of his
office" (p . 14 ) . This is a theory that limits Congress to
approving the president ially-controlled organization.
Therefore, we can deduce that he considers reorganization
planning to be an executive function that should not be
performed by any other branch of government
.
Coordination by ideas, the second mechanism of
coordination, presupposes that reliance on coordination in
organization, though necessary, is not sufficient to
produce effective operation. A dominant central idea is
the foundation of organization, action and self-
coordination. As Gulick asserts, this mechanism is
necessary for developing the desire and will to work
together with a common purpose (p.37)
.
Gulick elaborated several principles of organization
that reflect the essence of the managerial perspective.
These principles centered on the creation of a strong
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executive end. the consolidation of agencies. More relevant
to this study are the following:
1) All agencies should be consolidated into a few
departments
.
2) The power of the department head should be
commensurate with his responsibility.
3) Responsibility for each function should be vested
in a specific official.
4) All administrative work should be headed up under a
single chief executive, who should be directly
elected by, and responsible to, the voters or their
representatives
.
5) The chief executive should have the power to
appoint and discharge department heads and to
direct their work.
6) The chief executive should have a research staff to
report on the work of the departments and search
for improved methods of operations.
These principles were applied particularly in the
President's Committee on Administrative Management in 1937,
as we will see in the next chapter.
The managerial perspective carries a vision of an
integrated executive. According to Gulick, integration is
required to provide central coordination of "unit tasks"
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defined by the division of work in the organization. In
"Notes on the Theory of Organization,
" he identifies four
bases into which the unit tasks of an organization can be
grouped: 1) purpose, which groups tasks by the service
provided; 2) process, under which tasks are grouped by the
skill or technology employed; 3) clientele or material; and
4) place (p.21-25)
.
The managerial perspective, examined through the work
of Luther Gulick, shows a normative emphasis on integration
and executive leadership. Unlike the framers' view on
executive authority, it portrays a President as manager of
the executive branch and advocates for an absolute
subordination of the executive branch to the President.
Moreover, it seems to provide no methods by which to
preclude an integrated executive branch headed by a
powerful chief executive from resulting in tyrannical
government
.
Because of its departure from the Founders' conception
of a Chief Executive, one can argue that the managerial
perspective presents a view of the President as a popular
leader. A Chief Executive comes to office with a popular
mandate acquired as a result of election. This popular
mandate can be translated into the presidential functions
of meeting people's expectations and being responsive to
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public opinion. In the managerial sense, these functions
are expressed through the emphasis on management and
control of the executive branch which, under the assumption
that they would produce effective administration, are
devices to respond to popular pressure. This constitutes a
departure from the Founders' conception of a Chief
Executive as responsible for the faithful execution of the
laws, a power based on the formal character of the office
and not on popular leadership.
The Legitimacy of the Administrative State
John Rohr (1985) offers a perspective on legitimating
the Administrative State. This perspective elaborates on
the framers' intention to create an energetic executive and
the managerial perspective's emphasis on presidential
supremacy. It reaffirms the former by broadening its
implications and contests the latter's focus on
presidential control. Given that in the 20th century, with
the development of the managerial perspective, the
President acquired a new role that both departs from the
Founders' conception of a Chief Executive and adheres to
the function of responsiveness to public opinion through
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the exercise of inanageinent and control, the legitimacy
perspective offers an avenue to return to the emphasis on
adherence to constitutional principles as a way to ensure
good government
. I examine this perspective from two
themes: 1) the notion of energy in the executive, and 2)
the formal virtue of public officials.
Before discussing these two themes, let us present a
definition of the Administrative State as viewed by the
legitimacy perspective. The Administrative State is the
Public Administration professionalized with substantial
discretion in areas of decision making but subject to rule
of law with the president as recognized Chief Executive.
This definition includes two points that are important to
understand the emphasis on legitimacy. One point is
"substantial discretion in areas of decision making." This
means that public officials have the constitutional right
to address problems of administrative governance and
influence the process of policy decision-making (Rohr,
1985) . The second point is "subject to rule of law with
the President as recognized Chief Executive." This implies
that the Public Administration is subordinate to
constitutional branches and is part of a hierarchical
structure with the President at the top.
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Legitimating the administrative state is not an attempt
to reject the subordinate nature of the public bureaucracy
to the Chief Executive or Congress. It is an act to
recognize that, by virtue of constitutional design, the
Public Administration possesses an opportunity to serve a
powerful political purpose that goes beyond simply
implementing the expression of the public opinion by either
constitutional superior. The Public Administration has, in
the legitimacy perspective's sense, a right to participate
in governance by adhering to constitutional principles.
This means that public administrators (bureaucrats) do not
necessarily have to do what the President or Congress tell
them to do if it is at odds with the Constitution. Thus,
the legitimacy perspective allows for the use of discretion
by bureaucrats to favor those policies that are responsive
to constitutional principles rather than to popular
pressure
.
The legitimacy perspective reaffirms the founders'
vision of an energetic administration. It broadens the
interpretation of the Hamiltonian concept of energy in the
Executive. According to Rohr, the concept of "energetic
administration" refers not only to a strong executive
vested with energy and independence, but also to an
administration entitled with formal right to assure good
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government
.
It was "through sound administration", says
Rohr, 'that the loyalties of the people would gradually be
transferred from the states to the federal government"
(p.138). Thus, an energetic executive implies political
value both in the president and the administration. As
Rohr would reason, both the President and his
administration are assigned a political task of higher
order centered on ensuring efficient government.
The managerial perspective discussed in the previous
section overlooks this dual emphasis on energy by drawing
exclusive attention to justifying the President as
controller of the bureaucracy. Through its single focus on
presidential supremacy over administration, it takes a
purely instrumental view of Public Administration. This
instrumental view confines the Public Administration to a
passive role of implementation of policies designed by
elected officials. Hence, the managerial perspective
prevents the public administrators from realizing what Rohr
calls the "oath to uphold the Constitution" (p.50). To
uphold the Constitution means, in Rohr's words, "to become
the kind of persons who cherish constitutional norms and
principles" (p.50).
The instrumental view of Public Administration
resembles the separation of politics and administration
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advocated by Frank Goodnow during the early 20th century.
This dichotomy relies on the division of two government
operations: 1) the expression of the will of the state,
and 2) the execution of the will of the state. The
rationale of this view is that the "people elect their
representatives, who, acting in their sovereign capacity,
pass laws which are duly carried out by the Public
Administration" ( Rohr, p.85). This separation presupposes
the subordinate status of the administrative authorities to
the legislature based on the superiority of expression over
execution. Nevertheless, in perpetuating the instrumental
view, the managerial perspective maintains a narrow
interpretation of representation that excludes public
administrators as constitutional actors from the process of
governance
.
The legitimacy perspective also recognizes the formal
virtue of public officials that enables them to contribute
to ensure good government . The founders ' concern for the
principle of efficient government justifies legitimating
the administrative state on the basis of the formal virtue
of public officials. That is, it recognizes that public
officials have the constitutional right to act as
safeguards against arbitrary power.
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To recognize the formal virtue of public officials is
"pregnant with a legitimating argument for the non-elected
official to participate in rule" (Rohr, p.79)
.
The basic
point is that appointive officials, like members of
Congress, derive their authority from the Constitution.
The fact that members of Congress and the President are
popularly elected does not make them the only
representatives of the people. Public officials, although
inferior to the President, "depend on the same authority
source that has created the office of the President" (Rohr,
P-80). Therefore, representation is not endemic only to
elected officials. As Rohr states, the founders' emphasis
on the character of representation relies on the act of
pondering "the public spiritedness of bureaucrats, instead
of simply fulminating about how to curtail and control
them" (p . 49
)
.
The formal virtue of public officials also presupposes
their liberty to choose among constitutional masters.
Public Administrators, according to Rohr, have the duty to
carry out the will of the people through the elected
officials. His argument reflects the centrality of the
separation of powers in the United States Constitution.
Unlike the managerial perspective, he sees career officials
as responsible to both Congress and the President. The
36
basic point is that both the President and Congress have
legitimate claims as superiors of the bureaucracy — not
the President alone. Having two "bosses", however, leaves
the bureaucracy (the Public Administration) free to choose
in instances of disagreement between the President and
Congress. This allows the bureaucrat to choose one
constitutional superior on grounds other than the fact that
he is elected. "If these grounds", writes Rohr, "are
related to the constitutional principle of his oath of
office, he could justify preferring one elected official to
another on a democratic principle that is deeper than mere
election" (p.84) . Thus, the legitimacy perspective favors
substantial discretion of public administrators to obey
those policies they believe are responsive to the public
interest and assure good government.
This chapter examined three perspectives on executive
organization. The founders' perspective, reflecting an
effort to cure the defects of the Articles of
Confederation, centered on the establishment of a strong
executive with formal authority over administration. The
managerial perspective, reflecting a theory of effective
organization, both reaffirmed this purpose by focusing on
an enhanced presidential authority and departed from the
Founders' conception of a Chief Executive. The legitimacy
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perspective, seeking to justify the American governmental
bureaucracy
,
came to broaden the founders
' concern for an
energetic executive and contest the managerial
perspective s instrumental view of Public Administration.
The next chapter turns to the practical application of the
founders 1 and the managerial perspectives in the
reorganization movement in the United States. The
legitimacy perspective will be used in chapters 3 and 4 to
examine how the reorganization of the Executive Branch of
the Government of Puerto Rico adopted the managerial
perspective's instrumental view of Public Administration.
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CHAPTER II
MODERN EXECUTIVE REORGANIZATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
Modern Executive reorganizations under the
administrations of Presidents Roosevelt, Truman and Nixon
embraced the task of enhancing the role of the President as
Chief Executive. They constituted serious efforts to
reorganize the executive branch centered on the nature of
executive authority, on the centralization of the executive
establishment, and on the appropriate techniques for
ensuring sound administration and executive control.
These reorganizations were attempts to resolve the
problem of an ill-equipped presidency unable to ensure sound
management of the executive branch. They pointed to the gap
between formal presidential authority to conduct the
business of administration and the practice. Among the
reorganizations here examined, there seemed to be a shared
intention to concretize the founders' vision of a strong
executive. Similarly, a practical application of the
managerial perspective's emphasis on presidential supremacy
over the executive branch, discussed in the previous
chapter, is identifiable.
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branch. From F.D. Roosevelt's perspective, the emphasis
was grounded in combining the founders
' concern for a
^ ^ rong executive with the managerial perspective's
prescription of presidential control; this became, for New
Deal reformers, the way to strengthen the Executive. With
this precedent, the grounds of reorganization under the
Truman Administration adopted a reaffirming style to
address the question of enhancement of executive authority.
During the Nixon Administration, the objective of
executive reorganization was to improve the President's
capacity to manage and control the executive branch. In
summary, these reorganizations proposed that a sound
administration should be a representation of presidential
supremacy
.
The President's Committee on Administrative Management
(1936-1937): Presidential Administrative Management
Though there were earlier reorganization efforts,
President F.D. Roosevelt made the first comprehensive
attempt to reorganize the executive branch. There were two
conditions that led Roosevelt to consider reorganization.
One condition was the growth of the US Government. The
state of an economy in disarray led to the creation of
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emergency agencies to deal with this problem. As a result,
over a hundred agencies formally reported directly to the
president. The acute problem, notes Emmerich (1971), was
how to manage the sprawling and brawling executive
establishment and how to relate new and emergencies
agencies to the regular departments" (p.48). This
situation raised doubts abroad as to the ability of the
United States system to provide effective leadership and
solve the problem of modern government (Arnold, 1986)
.
The other condition was an ill-equipped presidency
unable to effectively perform the administrative task of
coordinating the increased number of agencies
. The
President lacked both staff assistance and the resources to
exert managerial direction of the executive branch.
Roosevelt attempted to address these problems by
bringing together agencies with overlapping policies. To
achieve this goal, he considered two mechanisms. First, he
created the Executive Council on July 11, 1933 through
Executive Order 6202A. The Council was composed of the
whole cabinet, the heads of the emergency agencies, and the
budget director. This mechanism, however, failed to be an
efficient instrument of policy coordination (Arnold, 1986).
President Roosevelt's second mechanism was the
National Executive Council (NEC)
,
created through Executive
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Unlike theOrder 6433A issued on November 17, 1933.
Executive Council, the NEC was a smaller, more homogeneous
and more centralized body. It included only the heads of
the Agriculture, Commerce and Labor Departments rather than
the whole cabinet, and the heads of the New Deal agencies.
Nevertheless, this coordination effort failed to solve
problems that arose between agencies
.
On March 22, 1936, Roosevelt established the
President's Committee on Administrative Management (The
Brownlow Committee)
. This was a presidential commission to
study the structure of the executive branch and to make
recommendations as to how to manage it more effectively.
As Emmerich observed, it was "to consider the problem of
overall management of the entire executive establishment,
including the relations of the new and emergency agencies
to the regular departments" (p.49).
The President's Committee was composed of Louis
Brownlow, chairman, Charles Merriam, and Luther Gulick.
These three men were selected for their knowledge,
background, and experience in executive reorganization at
the state and local levels. Louis Bronwlow's credentials
included his work as Director of the Public Administration
Clearing House and Chairman of the Committee on Public
Administration of the Social Science Research Council at
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the University of Chicago, wide experience in journalism
and municipal government, and service as city manager in
Petersburg, Virgina, and Knoxville, Tennesse (Karl, 114)
Charles Merriam had worked as an adviser to mayors,
governors and presidents, and also made contributions to
both the theory and practice of government. Luther Gulick,
who was identified with Administrative reform movements at
the state and municipal levels, worked as Director of
Research for the Commission on Inquiry on Public Service
Personnel from 1933 to 1935, and President of the Institute
of Public Administration in New York.
The President's Committee applied to its work the
notion of presidential supremacy expressed in the
managerial perspective. Centered on the issue of
administrative management, the Committe considered the
President as responsible for all of the national
administration. Its underlying assumption, says Arnold,
was "that managerial direction and control of all
departments and agencies should be centered in the
President" (p.104) . The establishment of a responsible and
effective chief executive as the center of energy and
direction, in the Committee's view, was the requisite for
an efficient administration. Hence, the members of the
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committee paid almost exclusive attention to what they
referred to as "making democracy work"
.
This phrase presupposed an emphasis on equipping the
President with the tools for effective direction and
supervision of the executive establishment. As the
Committee Report stated, the President should be equipped
with "better means of managerial direction, better
personnel, better fiscal control, and better machinery for
planning in order to carry out the national aim and
programs ... imposed upon our Executive by our Constitution"
(Report of the President's Committee on Administrative
Management, 1937, p.51-52).
The Committee presented five main proposals oriented
toward executive strengthening and centralizing, general
prescriptions of the mangerial perspective. One proposal
was to expand the White House staff to increase support to
the President. The idea was to provide the president with
a group of assistants with knowledge in administrative
affairs. Another proposal was to strengthen and develop
the managerial agencies of the government, including those
dealing with budget, personnel, and planning. These
agencies were to be the management arms of the President.
The Committee also proposed to extend the merit system
upward, outward, and downward to cover all non-policy
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determining posts, and to reorganize the Civil Service
Commission under a single administrator. This
recommendation followed the managerial perspective's
that administrative work should be headed up
under a single chief executive. Without granting personnel
administration functions, this proposal would strengthen
the Civil Service Commission by turning it into a Citizen
Civil Service Board to serve as watchdog of the merit
system
.
In addition, the committee proposed to place the 100
independent agencies, administration, authorities, boards,
and commissions under 12 major departments. The major
proposed departments included State, Treasury, War,
Justice, Post Office, Navy, Conservation, Agriculture,
Commerce, Labor, Social Welfare, and Public Works. This
proposal, reflecting Gulick's principle that all agencies
should be consolidated into a few departments, put upon the
President continuing responsibility for the maintenance of
effective organization. A final proposal was to establish
accountability of the Executive to Congress. The mechanism
to accomplish this was an independent Auditor General
responsible for post-audit of all fiscal transactions.
Clearly, these recommendations followed the managerial
perspective's emphasis on the values of efficiency and
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centralization of executive authority in the President.
These values were to be promoted, observes Lowi (1985)
,
by
the centralization of the executive powers of the national
government in the presidency. As the Report states,
. . .the canons of efficiency require the
establishment of a responsible and effective chief
executive as the center of energy, direc-
tion, and administrative management; the syste-
matic organization of all activities in the hands
of qualified personnel under the direction of the
chief executive, and, to aid him in this, the
establishment of appropriate managerial and staff
agencies
.
Thus, the interest in top-level management was the
essential view that led the committee members to all its
recommendations
.
After the Committee Report was sent to Congress,
Senator James F. Byrnes (SC) and Congressman Lindsay Warren
(NC) took on the task of drafting the reorganization bill.
This bill was not exempt from congressional and media
attacks. In Congress, Senator Byrd opposed the
reorganization bill for political reasons. As Arnold
noted, he was disappointed with the President's Committee
for not including him among those who were briefed on the
report. Senator Byrd later initiated a proposal to
reorganize the executive branch through the Brookings
Institution in Washington, D.C.
46
The strongest attack came from the press, which
developed a campaign of distortion and intimidation.
Influenced by anti-administration forces, the press claimed
that the passage of the reorganization bill would create a
dictatorship. As stated in one paper, "the president
reorganization bill stems directly from the infamous
Brownlow Report which frankly sought an executive
dictatorship" (Emerich, p . 5 6 ) .
Despite the opposition to the original reorganization
bill, Congress passed a Reorganization Act in 1939. This
law, however, was enacted after two congressional sessions
of failure and included only two of the recommendations of
the Committee Report. These recommendat ions were: 1)
continuing authority to the President to initiate
reorganization plans; and 2) administrative assistants to
the President. Roosevelt used this delegated authority to
issue his reorganization plan No . 1 of 1939 creating the
Executive Office of the President and moving the Bureau of
the Budget into it. He also issued Executive Order 8248 to
establish the formal relationships between the Executive
Office, the White House with its six assistants, the Bureau
of the Budget and the remaining components of the expanded
presidency (Arnold, 1985)
.
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Despite repeated attacks and congressional failures,
the President s Committee had several important
accomplishments. The Committee affirmed the principle of
broad presidential authority to initiate executive
reorganization. This principle changed the practice by
Congress of giving reorganization authority to the
President only in times of war and economic crisis. It did
not intend to increase the power of the President, but to
strengthen his role as Chief Executive. As Fain (1987)
states, it "advanced the proposition that reorganization
was essentially an executive function" (p.xxx). In this
way, Rohr (1985) notes, Congress' task was "to establish
the departments and then graciously step aside while the
President, in accordance with the principles of scientific
management, assigns them their activities" (p.139).
The most important accomplishment was the Committee's
formulation of a new concept of the administrative position
of the Chief Executive. It elaborated a new notion of
executive authority. The president became the centralizing
force, providing continuous management of the executive
branch. As Lowi (1985) says, Roosevelt put an end to a
congressional -centered government
.
This approach, rather than a reflection of the
founders' value orientation, represented a direct
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adaptation of the notion of a presidentally-controlled
executive branch expressed in the managerial perspective.
The subordinate nature of the administrative agencies
entailed, in the Committee's sense, strict subordination to
the President. In this way, administrative agencies became
instruments of a powerful president.
This emphasis on presidential supremacy represented a
departure from the founders' conception of the separation
of powers. The President's Committee's interpretation of
the separation of powers relied on stating that it "places
in the President, and in the President alone, the whole
executive power of the Government of the United States"
(Brownlow report, p.31). This led the Committee to
associate executive power with the president.
This view, however, overlooked the fact that, by
virtue of constitutional design, the President shares
executive powers with the department heads and Congress.
Rohr explains this point by saying: "If the president is
the government's chief executive officer, he cannot be at
the same time its sole executive officer. Chief, as a
hierarchical term, necessarily implies that subordinates
possess to a lesser degree the power that is the chief's in
the fullest, but not exclusive, sense" ( p . 4 0
)
.
Exclusive
attention to control of subordinates by the President was
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intended to justify presidential control over the executive
branch. This showed an effort to make the executive the
dominant branch.
The Commi ssion on Organization of the Executive Rranch of
the Government
—[Hoover Commission) : the enhancement of thp
President as manager of the Governmpnt
After World War II, during the Truman Administration,
there was a consensus as to the need to re-evaluate the
state of the executive branch. In 1947, Congress
established the Commission on the Organization of the
Executive Branch of the Government (the Hoover Commission)
to make recommendations with regard to how to organize the
executive branch. This new attempt, says Emmerich, stemmed
from the need "to bring into an integrated organization
structure the numerous agencies left in the wake of war and
demobilization (p.82).
President Truman signed the bill that created the
Commission and suggested the appointment of ex-President
Hoover as head of the Commission. He shared with Congress
interest in considering the state of administration
resulting from the accumulated New Deal, War, and post-war
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programs
.
In 1953, Congress initiated a second Hoover
Commission. But here, I examine only the first Commission
because of its emphasis on structural reorganization of
government agencies and concern with strengthening
executive authority.
The Hoover Commission wrote nineteen reports. The one
titled "General Management of the Executive Branch" is of
special interest for our purposes. This report carried the
philosophy of the Commission as to the organization of the
executive branch. As Ronald Moe (1982) noted, the main
assumption in this report was that a reorganization of the
executive branch would give it simplicity of structure,
unity of purpose, and clear lines of executive authority.
Throughout this report, the Commission sought to
strengthen the authority of the President to reorganize the
executive branch. Its general purpose was clearly stated:
"Establish a clear line of control from the President to
those departments and agencies heads and from them to their
subordinates with correlative responsibility from these
officials to the President, cutting through the barriers
which have in many cases made bureaus and agencies
partially independent of the chief executive" (U.S.
Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the
Government, General Management of the Executive Branch,
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Washington; 1949, p.7). This objective reaffirmed the
Brownlow Committee's purpose of simplifying the
bureaucratic structure of the Government. Likewise, it
extended the intention of the founders to create a strong
executive
.
The report on General Management of the Executive
Branch recognized the inability of the President to assure
sound management. Its prescription centered around
grouping agencies and departments based on major purposes.
The Commission found that the executive branch was not
organized into a workable number of major departments and
agencies which the President can effectively direct..."
(The Hoover Commission Report, 1949, p.4). One
recommendation was to give Department Secretaries full
responsibility and authority for the conduct of their
departments. There should also be delegation of decision-
making in the areas of accounting, budgeting, recruiting
and personnel management to the operating agencies.
Finally, it recommended staff support to department heads
(Hoover Report, p.7)
.
The Commission concluded that the
various agencies be consolidated into about one-third of
the present number.
The Commission introduced some changes in the
Executive Office of the President created by President
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Roosevelt. It recommended a new Office of Personnel to be
headed by the chairman of the Civil Service Commission.
It also recommended exemption of congressional approval for
the heads of the Executive Office of the President.
Another change was the replacement of the Council of
Economic Affairs by the Office of Economic Adviser to be
directed by a single administrator. Finally, the Hoover
Commission recommended enhancement of the authority of the
President to initiate reorganization plans in order to
effectuate changes in the government structure (Moe, 1982).
The application of the Gulick's principle of single
administrator and executive leadership is unmistakable.
The other four recommendations were also intended to
strengthen the ability of the President to manage the
government more effectively. For instance, the section on
Budget and Accountability proposed a closer relationship
between the Bureau units and the White House. To deal with
the problem of lack of central direction of activities in
the Federal Government, the Commission proposed the
establishment of the Office of General Services. This
office was to be headed by an administrator responsible
directly to the President. Within this section, the
Department of Treasury was to become the "real fiscal
center of the government" (Moe, p.38) . To accomplish this
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goal, the Commission proposed the transfer of agencies and
functions related to fiscal management (such as the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, and the Export-Import Bank) to the
Department
.
The Hoover Commission, like the Brownlow Committe,
strengthened the presidency. Its major contribution was
the enhancement of the position of the President as manager
of the government. It also enhanced the position of the
chairman of the Civil Service Commission and facilitated
presidential accountability through the transfer of
agencies to major departments. The approach was similar to
that of the Brownlow Committe: "It stressed
accountability" (Nathan, 1983, p.4).
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The As h Council fl Q^ 9 -i 97 i
i
j— Administrative Prp s idpnry
The emphasis on executive authority and centralization
continued during the Nixon Administration. The purpose of
the On April 8, 1969, President Nixon established the
Presidents Advisory Council on Executive Organization,
known as the Ash Council. council was to develop a
comprehensive executive branch reorganization proposal that
would improve the Presidents capacity to manage the
executive branch, and meet service demands placed upon
government (Nathan, 1983). In the words of Nixon: "...I
have concluded that a sweeping reorganization of the
Executive Branch of the government is needed to keep up
with the times and with the needs of the people" (qtd. in
Fain, 1987, p. 5)
.
This proposition reflects Nixon's concern for
administrative responsiveness to the particular demands of
the political and environmental context in which his
administration worked and to the special demands of the
citizens. In a broader sense, the initial intention of
Nixon]ps reorganization initiative was to provide a
government responsive to the people.
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The Ash Council presented an assumption similar
to that of the Brownlow Committee and the Hoover
Commission. The common premise was that the executive
branch had become t o fragmented due to the proliferation
of programs and agencies. To address this problem of
fragmentation, the Council's prescription was reduction of
agencies to a small number of departments, which would
create more centralized lines of authority within the
executive branch. This approach presupposed the creation of
broader functional departments and expected to enhance the
value of efficiency in the management of the federal
Government. In this way, the Ash Council employed the
traditional public administration approach to reorganize
the executive branch used by the Brownlow Committee and the
Hoover Commission.
The reorganization proposed by the Ash Council
included three major changes. First, it would retain four
executive departments in being: State, Treasury, Defense,
and Justice. Second, it would abolish seven existing
departments: Agriculture, Interior, Commerce,
Transportation, Labor, Health, Education and Welfare, and
Housing and Urban development. Third, there would be four
•
*
new executive departments: Human Resources, Community
Development, Natural resources, and Economic Affairs. Each
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department would be headed by a Secretary assisted by a
staff
.
Nixon based his reorganization on the notion that the
government was organized around methods and subjects rather
than purposes and goals. He considered the lack of unity in
each department the cause of ineffectiveness in government.
The basic assumption was that organizing a department with
a given set of purposes to be achieved would assure
accountability of that department. "The new departments,
"
wrote Fain (1987), "would have important new functions,
expanded missions, streamlined authorities, and
strengthened internal organization and management" (p.16).
Thus, consolidation of agencies under major departments
based on the functional nature of that agency was the
adopted approach. The adoption of the principle of
grouping by task prescribed by Gulick is identifiable in
Nixon's reorganization.
The Ash Council's recommendations with regard to the
structure of the government were not only intended to
facilitate an effective management of the federal
Government, they also followed the strongest emphasis of
both the normative doctrine of the founders and the
prescriptive approach of the managerial perspective: to
enhance executive authority. The executive departments
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"were to be directly responsible to the President, thereby
assuring a more direct and efficient line of command
between the President and Cabinet members" (Fain, p.4)
.
Summary
The reorganization efforts examined in this chapter
addressed the inherited problem of a president unable to
manage effectively the executive branch. To deal with this
problem, they each pursued a common goal: to strengthen
the managerial role of the president as Chief Executive.
The mechanisms used were consolidation of agencies into few
departments, integration of units of similar functional
nature, and direction of administrative work by a single
chief executive. Thus, these comprehensive attempts to
reorganize the executive branch presented a concrete
application of the normative approaches provided by the
founders' and the managerial perspectives. The practical
application of these perspectives in the Reorganization of
the Executive Branch of the Government of Puerto Rico is
what the next chapter turns to.
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CHAPTER III
FOUNDING THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE IN PUERTO RICO
This chapter examines the first comprehensive
reorganization of the executive branch of the Government of
Puerto Rico. This reorganization was initiated in 1949 by
Luis Munoz-Marin, the first popularly elected Governor of
Puerto Rico. Through the work of the Commission on
Reorganization of the Executive Branch (the Rowe
Commission)
,
Munoz-Marin came to fix a defect in the system
of separation of powers formally established by the Jones
Act in 1917. The result was of great importance to the
development of the administrative and political systems in
Puerto Rico.
The Rowe Commission institutionalized an
administrative state with centralization of substantial
authority in the Governor as chief executive, reflective of
the executive model prevalent in the United States. I
would argue that the theoretical underpinnings that guided
the creation of the American strong executive with
authority over administration shaped the evolution of a
modern, strong executive in Puerto Rico, as well.
Particularly, the reorganization of the executive branch
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recommended by the Rowe Commission followed strictly the
principles of organization, prescribed by the managerial
perspective, which guided the reorganization of the
executive branch proposed by the President's Committee on
Administrative Management (The Brownlow Committee)
. A
direct application of the managerial perspective led the
Rowe Commission to accomodate an instrumental view of
public administration and, as a result, create a basis for
the illegitimacy of the administrative state.
Historical Antecedents
During the United States occupation of Puerto Rico
from 1898 until 1949, the executive in Puerto Rico was
weak, legislative-dependent, and the embodiment of
political illegitimacy. During the first half of the 20th
century, the executive acquired a non-representative nature
in the eyes of the Puerto Ricans, for he was a North
American appointed by the President of the United States.
Although legally granted administrative authority, in
practice he had limited influence over administration.
This weak and illegitimate nature of the executive in
Puerto Rico originated in two organic acts passed by the
United States Congress. In 1900, Congress approved the
Foraker Act, the first Organic Act of Puerto Rico. This
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law stlPulated that the President should appoint the
Governor of Puerto Rico to serve for a period of four
V tars
,
with the consent and approval of the United States
Senate. The cabinet would be composed of six members: a
secretary, a procurador general, a commissioner of the
interior, a treasurer, and a general auditor. These
officials were appointed by the President with the consent
and approval of the Senate.
The Governor appointed by the President was a North
American and citizen of the United States. The citizens of
Puerto Rico received no consultation and usually no warning
regarding the appointment of an outsider as Governor of
Puerto Rico. As Goodsell (1975) observed, the appointed
outsider "was a foreigner in every sense of the word; he
thought differently, acted differently, and spoke another
language" (p.34)
.
Like the Federal Executive, the Governor
of Puerto Rico was granted the formal authority to appoint
offices, veto legislation, execute laws, and be the chief
commander of the militia (Ramos de Santiago, 1965)
.
The Foraker Act also created a bicameral legislature.
The upper legislative chamber was named the Executive
Council, composed of the six cabinet members and five other
members appointed by the President. The act specified that
five members of the Executive Council had to be natives of
61
Puerto Rico. The lower legislative chamber was to be
comprised of 35 members elected popularly by the people of
Puerto Rico every two years.
The lack of executive authority was the result of
fragmented administrative responsibility. The Executive
Council, by provision of the Foraker Act, acted as a
council body to the governor with substantial oversight
over administration. This constituted a legislative
obstacle for the governor's attempts to exert greater
influence over the executive branch. The Foraker Act, in
this way, departed from the doctrine of separation of
powers. Although it established a bicameral legislative
assembly, it failed to prevent one branch from becoming the
dominant one by giving the Executive Council both
legislative functions as the upper legislative chamber and
executive functions as a council body sharing
administrative supervision with the governor.
Puerto Ricans considered the executive branch as
illegitimate since it was constituted mainly by North
Americans. Puerto Ricans had limited representation in the
Executive Council. This was the result, says Santana-
Rabell (1993), of a policy of exclusion of Puerto Ricans
from administrative affairs.
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The second organic act was the Jones Act, approved by
Congress on March 2, 1917. This legislation seemed to
offer a solution to the lack of executive authority over
administration. Formally establishing the separation of
powers, it eradicated the legislative power of the
Executive Council and created a Senate to be elected
popularly by the people of Puerto Rico. It also granted
the Governor the power to appoint the members of the
Executive Council, with the exception of the general
procurador and the Comissioner of Education, with the
consent and approval of the United States Senate. The
Executive Council, hence, became a mere council of the
governor (Ramos de Santiago, 1965)
.
The council members
were assigned certain administrative duties; however, the
Act did not change the appointive nature of the Governor.
The President continued to appoint a North American as
Governor of Puerto Rico. Since he was sent directly from
the mainland, the appointed governor had little or no
knowledge of the political, social and cultural demands of
Puerto Rico (Wells, 1969)
.
We can say that the Jones Act perpetuated the
political illegitimacy of the executive created by the
Foraker Act. The executive was not only unrepresentative
of the interests of the citizens of Puerto Rico, but was
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also controlled by the President of the United States. As
Santana-Rabel 1 states, "The Governor appointed to
administer the colony of Puerto Rico was a North American
who was inept, prepotent, and uninterested in solving the
country's problems" (p.49). In addition, the establishment
of the popularly-elected Senate strengthened the
representative character of the legislature. The main
result was a basis for legislative supremacy over
administration
.
Legislative Supremacy Over Administration
Like the executive in the United States before the
ratification of the Federal Constitution, the Governorship
in Puerto Rico was subordinate to the legislature. The
figure of the governor was weak. The insular legislature,
composed only of Puerto Ricans, exerted a pervasive control
over the executive branch (Goodsell, 1975).
The problem of a weak Puerto Rican executive stemmed
from the dichotomy between formal administrative authority
and its practice. The Jones Act attempted to strengthen
the administrative authority of the governor by recognizing
him as "the supreme executive power". Through the
64
separation of powers, it granted the governor the authority
to appoint all the departments heads and request them to
submit reports directly to him. Thus, says Goodsell, "The
Jones Act fortified the Governorship" (p.33)
Nevertheless, executive authority over administration
was in reality limited. The governor's statutory control
of the executive branch was mainly a theory. As Tugwell,
who was Governor of Puerto Rico from 1941 to 1946, stated:
The Governor of Puerto Rico could not move in any
possible direction, and, if he could, he had not the
wherewithal to do it wisely". He further contended that
nowhere in the civilized world at the present time,
perhaps, is there an executive with so little power"
(quoted in Goodsell, p.34)
.
The subordinate position of the executive can be
understood by looking at pervasive legislative encroachment
on the executive branch. Two facts support the contention
that there was legislative supremacy over administration.
One is that the fully elective nature of the legislature
gave local politicians ample opportunity to legitimately
use their political influence. They were, after all,
considered by the people as their only representatives.
A more important factor was that the legislature
controlled the administration through enacting statutes,
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passing appropriations, conducting investigations, and
confirming gubernatorial appointments (Goodsell, 1975)
Clearly, the Governor did not have power commensurate with
the formal character of his position. Although the Jones
Act vested the executive power in the Governor, it was
merely a formal grant of power that in fact failed to
prevent legislative encroachment. Let us examine two
mechanisms through which the legislature dominated the
administration
.
Confirmation of appointments was the mechanism mostly
used by the legislature to control the bureaucracy. The
common practice in Puerto Rico was "to withhold
confirmation unless the nominee was approved in advance by
the majority party of the upper chamber" (Goodsell, p.37).
This practice later became known as terna, which consisted
of a list of three names submitted to the governor by the
leaders of the majority party in the legislature for open
positions requiring confirmation. The list included only
members of the majority party or followers.
The terna forced the governor to select among the
three candidates; otherwise, no confirmation would be
forthcoming. This practice was successful in guaranteeing
legislative encroachment, for the candidates "owed their
loyalty to the legislative leadership and not to the
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governor, and thus the majority party had effective control
of all agencies they headed" (Goodsell, p.38)
.
The governor's ability to manage the executive branch
was also undermined by the establishment of multi-member
boards or commissions. This approach diminished the
governor's supervisory capabilities since, as Goodsell
notes, an agency headed by a board is more difficult for
the chief executive to control than one headed by a single
administrator. Indeed, the commissions practiced no
accountability either to the governor or the department
heads ( Santana-Rabell
, 1993) In being completely
accountable to the legislature, these agencies enjoyed no
administrative discretion by virtue of the statute that
created them. According to Santana-Rabell, the statutes
were written in such a way that they prevented flexibility
in the use of administrative discretion. This condition
created the need for strengthening the authority of the
executive with regard to administration.
The Elective Governor
In the early nineteen- fort ies
,
a new cooperative
enterprise to heighten the administrative authority of the
executive was created. Governor Tugwell and Luis Munoz-
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Marin (President of the Senate at that time) initiated a
movement that advocated for an elective Governor. Unlike
previous Governors, Tugwell, who was the last imported
Governor of Puerto Rico, was familiar with Puerto Rican
politics. His appointment as Governor from 1941 to 1946
was the result of his experience as an administrator in
national and municipal government, his work as a White
House confidant in drafting key New Deal measures to
rehabilitate the economy, and his tenure as Secretary of
Agriculture during the F.D. Roosevelt Administration.
Through personal visits to Puerto Rico to examine
agricultural conditions, he became associated with the
island's political problems. Moreover, his experience at
high levels of administration, says Goddsell, helped him to
acquire an understanding of the role of the chief executive
in a system of separation of powers. Luis Munoz-Marin
'
s
rise to political leadership was the product of a
combination of academic and political work. On the
academic side, he developed a strong background in
journalism and law while pursuing college and legal studies
at Georgetown University, as well as taking journalism
courses in Columbia University. He wrote for The Nation .
The New Republic , and the Baltimore Sun , and edited La
Democracia . his father's newspaper, through which he
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published his initial writings on governmental and social
reforms. On the political side, he acted as secretary to
his father who was Commissioner Resident of Puerto Rico in
Washington, D.C. While working in Washington, he both
received a background in American politics and solidified
his understanding of the political conditions in Puerto
Rico. In 1932, after returning from Washington, Munoz was
elected senator-at-large as a member of the Liberal Party.
His strong interest in politics led him to form his own
political organization, the Popular Democratic Party, which
in the 1940 elections won ten of the nineteen seats in the
Insular Senate. That year, he became the President of the
Senate, a position of substantial influence in Puerto Rican
politics
.
The Tugwell-Munoz enterprise set the basis for the
establishment of the administrative state with the governor
as the chief executive. Two steps oriented toward this
goal were the control of administration through the
elimination of the terna device of dictating gubernatorial
appointments, and the institutionalization of the Office of
the Governor to provide the governor with staff assistance
in supervising the bureaucracy.
These accomplishments, however, were not enough to
enhance the administrative authority of the governor.
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Tugwell was convinced that popular election was the
necessary condition for the governor of Puerto Rico to
exert effective control over the administration. It can be
said that Tugwell 1 s expereince with an elective executive
in the United States led him to consider the same
democratic procedure for the executive in Puerto Rico. But
this was a reform that required a congressional amendment
to the Jones Act, which was the statutory source of the
executive power in Puerto Rico.
Aware of this congressional requirement, Tugwell
stated in 1943: "It is my belief that there will not be
one until the Jones Act is rewritten to prescribe as one of
the Governor's qualifications that he must be a citizen of
Puerto Rico as well as of the United States and that he
must be elected by the other citizens of the Island"
(quoted in Goodsell, p.55-56). This communication
expressed Tugwell 's belief that Puerto Ricans, in a
democratic system, should be given the right to elect their
own leaders. He sent President Roosevelt a proposal for an
elective governorship. The results of this communication
were a presidential message to Congress on March 9, 1943
calling for an amendment to the Jones Act to permit an
elective governor and the creation of the President's
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Advisory Committee to make further legislative
recommendations
.
The President's Advisory Committee, which included
Tugwell and Munoz as members, favored strengthening the
administrative authority of the elected governor. The
basic assumption was that an elective governor would have
effective control over administration. This assumption
rested on the belief that the illegitimate character of the
executive, a product of its appointive nature, undermined
its ability to exert influence over administration. To
fulfill this goal, the committee presented to Congress a
bill providing for an administratively strong governor.
Nevertheless, the Territories and Insular Affairs Committee
in the United States Senate amended the bill, eliminating
the concept of a powerful chief executive in Puerto Rico
(Goodsell, 1975) . Eventually, the bill did not pass the
House Committee on Insular Affairs.
The elective-governor movement did not die after its
Congressional failure in 1943. President Truman in 1946,
after Tugwell
' s resignation from the position of Governor,
appointed Jesus T. Pinero, a citizen of Puerto Rico, as
Governor of Puerto Rico. This presidential appointment
constituted a step toward the eradication of the political
illegitimacy of the executive in Puerto Rico. But more
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important is that in 1947 Congress amended the Jones Act of
1917 to convert the appointive governorship into an
elective position. The main result was the popular
election of Luis Munoz Marin as Governor of Puerto Rico in
1948
.
The importance of the elective governor legislation
resided in that it catalyzed the growth of the
governorship. Luis Munoz Marin came to reduce the gap
between the formal administrative authority of the governor
and its practice. Although Tugwell initiated the efforts
to reduce this gap, Munoz successfully institutionalized a
strong governorship thorugh his comprehensive
reorganization of the executive branch.
The Reorganization Act of 1949
Munoz beleived that the weakness of the executive was
its inability to initiate administrative reforms as an
executive function. Enhancement of executive priority over
administration, in his view, required a Chief Executive
with authority to exercise this function. Acknowledging
that experience has shown the Legislature cannot itself
successfully deal with the problem of modernizing and
improving the organization of the Executive Branch, he said
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m a press conference: "The attempts by the Legislature
to reorganize the Executive Branch through detailed and
specific legislation ... have never been fruitful" (El Mundo,
March 25, 1949
,
p . 1 )
.
Munoz then became an embodiment of the ideal of a
strong execu t ive with admin i strative responsibili ty for the
executive branch. He initiated the era of modernization of
the executive branch in Puerto Rico and, more
significantly, created a new relationship between the
governorship and administration.
On March 26, 1949, Munoz submitted a project to the
Legislature that recognized reorganization of the executive
branch as an executive function. Stressing the need for
collaboration between the Executive and the Legislature,
the project advocated for leaving the initiative to
reorganize the executive branch to the Executive. This
effort embodied Munoz's use of political persuasion to
convince the Legislature of the necessity of delegating
reorganization power to the Executive. Munoz used the
expression "mutual trust" to refer to the relationship
between the Executive and the Legislature to assure the
acceptance of his reorganization bill and prevent major
procedural conflicts with the Legislature. He further
called this relationship necessary to strengthen the
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democratic basis of our political system.
. .making it
efficient in the formulation and execution of programs" (El
Mundo
,
March 18, 1949, p.l)
.
The result was a precedent of
real importance. The Legislature promptly approved the
bill as Reorganization Act 140, delegating responsibility
to the Executive to organize and ensure administrative
efficiency in the executive branch.
The Reorganization Act, approved on April 28, 1949,
represented the Legislature's acceptance of reorganization
of the Executive Branch as an executive function. It
granted the governor the power to examine and from time to
time reexamine the organization of all the executive
agencies and departments of the government and to determine
all changes necessary to promote the better execution of
the laws, and to assure the more effective management of
its departments and agencies through coordination and
consolidation (Reorganization Act 140, article 3). It also
provided for the establishment of a commission to examine
the executive branch and make recommendations, stipulating
that reorganization plans were to be submitted to the
Legislature at the beginning of a session and would take
effect the day following the adjournment unless disapproved
by both Houses by concurrent resolution . (Reorganization
Act
,
article 5 )
.
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The Rowe Commission
On June 9, 1949, Governor Luis Munoz Marin, under the
provisions of the Reorganization Act of 1949, appointed a
Commission for Reorganization of the Executive Branch of
the Government of Puerto Rico, composed of seven members.
In his own words, the members of the commission were
"citizens with ample experience in problems of
administration" (El Mundo, February 18, 1949, p.l)
.
Three
members were North Americans: James H. Rowe, who was the
chairman and had experience in government reorganization at
the federal level, Louis Brownlow, who presided over the
President's Committee on Administrative Management (The
Brownlow Committee) under the administration of President
Roosevelt, and Arnold Miles, Director of the Research
Division of the United States Bureau of the Budget. The
Puerto Rican members were Rafael Pico, President of the
Planning Board, Manuel A. Perez, Director of the Office of
Personnel, Enrique Cordova Diaz, member of the Statehood
Party, and the Senators Luis Negron Lopez and Benjamin
Ortiz. The commission became known as the Rowe Commission.
The commission's assignment was limited to problems in
the organization of the executive branch. In a letter sent
to all members, Munoz defined their role as to "make
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possible the fulfillment of a long and widely-felt need for
improvement in the operation of the Government" (June 9,
1949, p . 2 )
.
He also advised them of the problem of a
tremendous growth in the size and complexity of the
operations of the Puerto Rican administrative system. This
problem, said Munoz, caused confused lines of authority and
responsibility and unsatisfactory responsibility and
accountability of the departments and agencies to the Chief
Executive
.
To give exclusive attention to these administrative
management problems was the commission's task. The
commission was to "restrict itself to the organization and
management of the executive branch, avoiding questions of
policy..." (Report of the Rowe Commission, 1949, p.5). As
Munoz-Amato has observed, "it was not authorized to alter
the public policy, just to look for better means for its
execution" (quoted in Dimock, 1951, p.29)
.
Thus, its main
purpose was to study and evaluate the executive branch in
order to find for "the People of Puerto Rico better methods
for the more efficient and economical performance of the
things they wish their government to do for them" (Report,
P • 3 ) .
The Commission's language on gubernatorial supremacy
reflects an adherence to both the framers' and the
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managerial perspective. The creation of the following
norms that guided the commission's work echoed the framers'
orientation toward a strong executive (Report, p. 3-4):
1
. The chief executive should be equipped with
authority adequate to match constitutional
responsibility, and with sufficient staff support
to do those things which he must do.
2. The subordinate officer of the executive branch
should be accountable to the chief executive and,
through the chief executive, to the legislature
and to the people.
3 . The responsibilities of the subordinates of the
chief executive should be properly located and
directly fixed.
4. The various organization units should be grouped by
major purpose so as to minimize conflict,
duplication, and overlapping.
5 . Each activity of the government should be
administered through the form of organization best
suited to achieve its stated objectives.
6. Good organization should include adequate provision
for planning, coordination and control.
7 . Special provision should be made for continuing
attention to efficiency and economy.
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8. The Executive Branch as a whole should be so
organised as to manage with maximum effectiveness
its relations with other branches of the insular
government and with the Federal Government.
Although these norms presuppose a strong Chief
Executive as envisioned by the Founders, unification of the
executive power under the managerial control of the chief
executive as prescribed by the managerial prespective is
unmistakable. The governor came to play a central role in
managing the administrative institutions. Thus, the
governor's role as manager of the executive branch provided
a departure from the Founders' conception of a Chief
Executive under which the executive of Puerto Rico was
formally established. The emphasis shifted from faithful
execution of the laws to control and management of the
executive branch. In departing from the original
conception, the Governor became a more popular figure
rather than a formal one. This is inherent in the Rowe
Commission's implicit reference to responsiveness to public
opinion. As it states, the Governor's task is "to manage
effectively and economically the administrative machinery
of the government, and reflect the aspirations of the
people of Puerto Rico" (Report, p.3).
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This reflects the idea that the Governorship through
executive reorganization has been redesigned to be more
popular than formal
. This means that the Governor is more
concerned with meeting people's expectations, which he
interprets as a mandate acquired from direct popular
election. The strong emphasis on control and management is
intended to fulfill this popular mandate.
The Rowe Commission generated several recommendations
intended to enhance the position of the governor as Chief
Executive and to strengthen his capacity to manage the
executive branch effectively. The most important of these
considered the grouping of agencies and purposes. The
commission recommended that agencies, programs and
functions be re-grouped, consolidated, reduced or
eliminated to solve the problems of administrative
rationality of the executive branch. It recommended
reduction in the total number of agencies to 23, abolishing
29 separate organizations, transfering 24 more into
departments or agencies, and eliminating 6 other boards of
directors and 2 governing boards. Furthermore, it
recommended transfering of the Planning Board and the
Office of Personnel into the Office of the Governor.
The Commission also put emphasis on increasing staff
support for the Governor, for they believed that the
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Governor needed staff support to manage the executive
branch. Here is a reflection of the Brownlow Committee's
famous sentence: "The President needs help". The staffing
recommendations were divided into staff to the Governor and
staff to the Governorship. Recommendations as to Staff to
the Governor included creating a new post of Executive
Assistant for liaison with the departments and agencies and
organizing an ex-officio Council of Economic Advisers and
an Administrative Assistant for Economic and Social
Programming. As to Staff to the Governorship, the
Commission recommended organizing an Administrative
Management Division in the Bureau of the Budget to assist
the Governor in dealing with problems of organization and
administration as they arise. In addition, it recommended
removing from the Office of the Governor the Office of
Transportation and the Office of Investigations of Unlawful
Games
.
The logic behind the Commission's recommendations
rested on notions of strong popular leadership and
centralized executive power. "Popular" refers to the
source of authority and leadership in public opinion. The
commission's concern with responsiveness to the public's
expectations suggests an informal institutionalization of
gubernatorial leadership in public opinion rather than a
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formal institutionalization in constitutional character. In
organizing agencies hierarchically by purpose, the
Commission supported the conception of the Governor as the
embodiment of authority over administration. Its call for
^ Is “headed agencies to promote executive efficiency was
a reflection of both the framers' concern for unity and
energy in the executive and the managerial perspective's
principle that all agencies should be headed by a single
executive. Thus, these organizational recommendations were
devices to strengthen the position of the Governor as
manager of the executive branch. Like the Brownlow
Committee's recommendations, The Rowe Commission's
recommendations were intended to strengthen top-level
management and institutionalize the doctrine of
inseparability of good administration and strong executive
leadership
.
The Rowe Commission represented the high point of
development of the Puerto Rican Administrative State. It
established a structure than resembled the organizational
model prevalent in the United States. The primary feature
was a hierarchical structure with centralization of
substantial authority in the Governor as the Chief
Executive, who coordinates and controls the entire
executive establishment . The departments and agencies were
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organized by major function, and each became headed by a
sincfls administrator with strict accountability to the
Governor. The administrative state thus embodied the
Hamiltonian doctrine of a strong executive. Equally, its
establishment was based on the principles of unity of
command and control prescribed by the managerial
perspective
.
To understand the success of the reorganization agenda
initiated by the Rowe Commission, it is necessary to
understand the political context within which it sought
realization. The reforms proposed faced no opposition in
the legislature since 10 of the 11 reorganization plans
submitted by Governor Munoz were approved (De Jesus in
Dimock, 1952)
.
This was the effect, observes Benjamin
Ortiz (1952), of "a complete harmony between the Executive
Branch and the Legislature in the name of greater
administrative efficiency and the establishment of an
authentic democracy in Puerto Rico" (p.112). A more
important factor, says Wells (1969), was the leadership of
Munoz Marin as well as his ability and popularity among the
leaders of the majority party in the legislature. His
years as President of the Senate helped him establish a
strong base of support. Above all, the legitimacy that
Munoz brought to the Governorship, based on the elective
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nature of his position, contributed to the success of his
administrative reforms.
Luis Munoz Marin was the first elected governor who met
the criteria of an administrative state as defined by the
Rowe Commission. The Rowe Commission was his instrument to
found an administrative state with a strong executive. He
deserves the title of founder of the Puerto Rican
Administrative State. Through the work of the Rowe
Commission, his reforms introduced a state of improvement
of the administrative mechanism in Puerto Rico and started
the development of a managerial governorship. Although
Munoz brought political legitimacy to the Puerto Rican
Governorship, the Commission he appointed to reorganize the
executive branch developed a rhetoric that contributed to
creating a weak legitimacy in the resulting administrative
state
.
The Rhetoric of the Rowe Report
The Rowe Report provides a rhetoric similar to that of
the Brownlow Report. The point of connection resides in
the Rowe Report's adoption of the distinction between
policy and administration. This dichotomy, as discussed in
the first chapter of this study, sharply separates two
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government operations: 1) the expression of the will of
the state, and 2) the execution of she will of the state.
The Rowe Report defines the task of the executive as
faithfully executing the will of the people through the
effective administration of the public business" (p.20)
Although this fortifies the position of the governor as
manager of the Executive Branch, it consummates the
ideological separation between policy and administration.
Like the Brownlow Report, the Rowe P.eport supports this
view by describing every executive activity as "executive
management " --Planning management, Fiscal management,
Revenue Administration and Treasury management, and
Personnel management (p.21).
There was in the Rowe Report a second rhetorical
emphasis that points to the illegitimacy of the
administrative state. The report was effective in
establishing a strict accountability to the Governor by the
appointive officials. Acknowledging the subordinate
position of the administrative institutions to the elective
governor, the report states, "The paramount purpose of
general systems of management by the Governor is that he
may extend his management downward throughout the Executive
Branch and be better able to hold all the subordinate units
strictly accountable to him for the proper performance of
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their duties (p.21). But this emphasis on strict
accountability overlooks an important point. As Rohr (1985)
contends, the administrative institutions are also
subordinate to the legislature because execution is
ultimately subordinate to expression. Thus, the
administrative agencies have more than one constitutional
superior to whom they must respond.
In introducing the strict accountability to the
executive, the Rowe Report not only supported the
pol icy/administration dichotomy but also accommodated an
instrumental view of Public Administration. The Public
Administration was to be an instrument of the executive and
was intended to be apolitical. Appointed officials were to
be accountable to the executive for "clearly defined and
fixed responsibilities, for which the Governor is in turn
responsible to the Legislative Assembly and to the people"
(Rowe Report, p.141) . This is a language that put
sovereignty in the Governor and not in the people. Through
institutionalizing this instrumental view, the Rowe Report
interpreted the notion of representation as endemic only to
elected officials. As Rohr would say, it ignored "the fact
that some offices are filled by election and others by
appointment says nothing about the connection between the
people and the occupant of a particular office" (p.80)
.
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elective and appointive officers derive their
authority from the same source, the Constitution. Thus,
the rhetoric of the Rowe Report overlooked the fact that
appointive officials, because of constitutional design,
possess a formal virtue that enables them to act, in case
of disagreement between their constitutional superiors, as
a safeguard against arbitrary power.
This approach of strict accountability to the Governor
represented a direct application of the notion of an
executive branch controlled by the Chief Executive,
expressed in the managerial perspective. With this
emphasis on executive supremacy, the Rowe Report departed
from the doctrine of the separation of powers. The
Report's intention to place in the Governor the whole
executive power led itself to associate executive power
with the Governor. This view, as Rohr would say, overlooks
that the Governor, by constitutional design, shares
executive powers with the department heads and Legislature.
Therefore, the Report's exclusive attention to control of
subordinates by the Governor attempted to justify executive
supremacy over the executive branch.
It is clear that the Rowe Commission called for a break
in legislative control over administration. Its main
contribution was the formulation of a new concept of the
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administrative position of the Governor. Resting on the
assumption that the interests of good administration and
the Governor's interests were identical, it led to a
"modern" position on gubernatorial authority over
administration. Therefore, we can attribute to the Rowe
Commission the initiation of modern comprehensive
reorganization agenda in Puerto Rico.
The founding of the Administrative State in Puerto Rico
was a reflection of the theoretical underpinnings that
guided the evolution of the American Administrative State.
The governor's administrative capacity was a priority for
the members of the Rowe Commission. Like the Brownlow
Committee, the Rowe Commission connected its work to the
needs of the Chief Executive. The Rowe Report was
Federalist in its prescription of a rigorous and united
executive. However, its understanding of sound
administration as strict accountability of appointive
officials to the Governor and its conception of
representation as a quality only of elective officials
created a basis for a weak legitimacy of the administrative
state. The next chapter turns to the application of these
theoretical underpinnings to the most recent reorganization
of the Executive Branch in Puerto Rico and examines the
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continuity of the problem of legitimacy of the
administrative state.
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CHAPTER IV
EXECUTIVE REORGANIZATION UNDER GOVERNOR ROSELLO
This chapter examines the most recent reorganization
of the executive branch of the Government of Puerto Rico,
initiated by Governor Rosello in 1993 . Although attempted
44 years after the first executive reorganization in 1949,
it shows an approach to organization similar to that
employed in the Rowe Report. The managerial perspective,
which advocates a managerial role for the chief executive
based on control and strict accountability, was influential
in the development of this reorganization proposal. In
adopting this perspective's dominant principles of
organizations, just as the Rowe Commission did, this
reorganization perpetuates the instrumental view of public
administration implied in the managerial perspective.
A Brief view of executive reorganizations from 1968 to 1993
The need for reorganization of the Executive Branch of
the Government of Puerto Rico has been the subject of
various commissions during the second half of the 20th
century. Santana-Rabell (1993) identifies five
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reorganizations since the Rowe Commission in 1949. A
detailed examination of these reorganizations is not within
the scope of this study. Nevertheless, their common
emphasis on a strengthened executive is worth examining.
Under the provisions of the Reorganization Act of
1968, Governor Luis A. Ferre established the Commission on
Reorganization of the Executive Branch. Unlike the Rowe
Commission, this commission did not attempt a comprehensive
reorganization of the executive establishment. It limited
ins work to seeking administrat ive rationality through
coordination and integration of functions and agencies. It
focused on the mechanisms of consolidation, restructuring
and transfer of agencies into major departments as a means
to facilitating the superintendence of the executive
branch
.
In 1976, during the Hernandez-Colon Administration,
the legislature approved a new reorganization act that
superseded the previous one. The importance of this
legislation to our purposes is that it centralized the
powers of reorganization completely in the Governor and
limited the role of the legislature to merely instrumental
( Santana-Rabell ) . Governor Hernandez-Colon, under the
provisions of the reorganization act, appointed a new
Commission for Reorganization of the Executive Branch. The
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most important objective of this commission was to improve
the instruments and mechanisms of coordination, supervision
and control of the executive branch by the Governor. One
of its guiding norms was to provide the Governor with
managerial techniques for the planning, integration,
supervision and evaluation of administrative activities
within the executive branch. Thus, this reorganization,
reasons Santana-Rabell
, returned to the emphasis on
centralization of executive authority expressed in the Rowe
Report
.
With the election of Romero-Barcelo as new Governor of
Puerto Rico in 1977, the Reorganization Act of 1976 was
amended to create a new Commission on Reorganization. The
purpose of this commission was to study and evaluate the
integration, composition, functions, and procedures of the
executive branch, and make the necessary recommendations to
effectuate an integral organization. Its main mission was
to produce an organizational structure with centralization
of substantial authority in the Governor. The assumption,
states Santana-Rabell, was that the disarticulate growth of
the Executive Branch has undermined the capacity of the
governor to supervise, coordinate and control the
multiplicity of government organizations. Therefore, it
recommended the reduction of the number of executive
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departments to 14 in order to facilitate the supervision
and coordination of the executive branch by the Governor.
After the Commission of Reorganization of 1981, two
other attempts to reorganize the executive branch were
initiated by private sector organizations. In 1985, the
Subcommittee on Reorganization of the Government of the
Committee for the Economic Development of Puerto Rico,
Inc., presented its Study of the Organization and Function
of the Executive Branch of the Government of Puerto Rico.
The paramount purpose was to study the organization of the
government and propose strategies for the modernization and
improvement of the government structure. Unlike the
previous reorganization efforts, it proposed the
improvement of the quality of management and administrative
personnel, revision of the current systems, methods and
administrative procedures, and strengthening of middle
management as the best way to enhance the capacity of the
Governor to guide and control the executive branch.
The second reorganization attempt by a private sector
organization was directed by the Committee on Efficiency
and Decentralization of the Governmental Activity, a
subcommittee of the Commerce Chamber of Puerto Rico. Its
report proposed the reduction of the size of the
government, elimination of excessive management and
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administrative positions, and dispersion of governmental
activity to the rural areas. According to the committee,
the complexity of the government organization makes it
practically impossible for the chief executive to guide and
supervise directly the extensive and diverse gamut of
government entities that hierarchically respond directly to
the Office of the Governor (qtd. in Santana-Rabell
,
p.150).
This effort, however, had no impact on the reorganization
of the executive branch. The failure of private sector
organizations to effect any changes to the structure and
organization of the executive branch turned the initiative
of executive reorganization back to the Governor.
Reorganization Act of 1 Q Q 3
Like previous Governors, Governor Rosello incorporated
reorganization planning as a tool for increasing his
managerial control of the executive branch. In the
platform of the New Progressive Party (NPP)
,
called the
Leadership of Ideas, he described reorganization planning
as an activity "to transform the role of the government as
one 'paternalistic' and provider to one
'facilitator' . . .
" (p.10)
.
The platform presented six main
strategies of his reorganization: 1) to create 16
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umbrella departments in which agencies, programs and
o f f i t s s of similar functional natures will be grouped; 2)
to transfer functions to the private sector; 3) to refocus
priorities in public budgeting and reduce public cost; 4)
to decentralize governmental activities that limit
initiative on the private sector and preclude economic
development; and 6) to strengthen the control of the
government over public corporations and their processes of
development of policies (Political Platform, p.ll). In
this way, the political platform set the arena for Governor
Rosello's initiative in proposing a new reorganization act
that would grant him powers to reorganize the executive
branch
.
On January 12, 1993, Governor Rosello sent to the
Legislature the initial project on reorganization
requesting delegation of power to restructure the
government. After being referred to the Senate, the
majority approved it as the Project of the Senate no. 4.
This project promised a comprehensive administrative reform
of the government based on the integration, elimination and
consolidation of executive agencies and departments under
major umbrella departments ( Nuevo Dia , January 7, 1993)
.
Governor Rosello acknowledged that, as of January 1993, the
executive branch was comprised of 54 public corporations,
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51 executive agencies, 8 departments created by law, 11
offices in the Office of the Governor, and 14 support
offices in the Fortaleza (the Governor's House)
. The
reorganization project proposed to reduce the support
agencies to nine and the offices in the Office of the
Governor to five, consolidate 51 government agencies to 42,
and integrate the 56 public corporations to 47. This
arrangement of umbrella departments, said the Governor,
"will provide flexibility, better communication and
coordination in the implementation of public policies to
the benefit of the people" ( Nuevo Dia . August 22, 1993)
.
Thus, an excessive growth of the government justified the
Rosello Administration's case for reorganization.
To understand the fate of this bill, it is important
to look at the controversy that arose. Unlike the
Reorganization Bill Governor Munoz-Marin submitted to the
Legislature in 1949, the Project of the Senate no. 4 faced
strong criticism. The fact that the proposal was reviewed
by a NPP-controlled legislature accelerated its approval,
without a careful examination of its implications.
The passage of this project stimulated strong
criticism from diverse social and political sectors. One
can contend, as Diclerico (1979) would say, that the
Executive will face opposition every time he attempts a
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reorganization of the Government through the transfer,
abolition, or consolidation of government agencies. As he
says, reorganizations can not avoid the political context
in which they are attempted" (p. 123). Nevertheless, under
Munoz Marin the attempt to reorganize the executive branch
faced no opposition. The need of a strong executive after
years of legislative encroachment, besides the popularity
of Munoz-Marin among party members, justified the
reorganization initiative.
The criticism pointed to the constitutional
implications of the Project of the Senate no. 4. The main
claim was that the approved reorganization proposal
threatened the system of separation of powers. The basic
point was not that the legislation granted the Governor
ample authority to create, consolidate and abolish agencies
and departments, but that it contained provisions that
precluded the Legislature from amending the project or the
reorganization plans, and required explanation for
legislative rejection, if this were the action taken ( Nuevo
Dia . February 1, 1993, p.5). The assumption behind this
proposed legislative approval process was that it would
bring flexibility to the whole reorganization initiative.
Other criticisms emphasized that the project lacked
dispositions to protect the job of employees of the
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agencies to be consolidated, transferred or abolished, and
that the project did not include a three-party commission
composed of experts in public administration ( Nuevo Pi a .
January 12, 1993). These criticisms led the presidents of
the Senate and the House of Representatives, Roberto Rexach
Benitez and Zaida Hernandez, respectively, to review the
proposed project and present a Substitute to the P. of S.
no. 4. Eventually, this substitute became the
Reorganization Act of 1993.
To restore the confidence of the diverse social and
political sectors, the Reorganization Act introduced
several changes. A difference with the Reorganization Act
of 1949 is that it created a Legislative Joint Commission
on the Reorganization Plans of the Executive
Reorganization, to be composed by nine senators and nine
representatives of which no less than three should be from
the minority. Instead of studying the organization of the
Executive Branch and making recommendations, the role of
the commission was to conduct a preliminary analysis of the
reorganization plans submitted by the Governor. It was
also to hold public hearings in order to adopt a report for
submission to the Senate and the House of Representatives.
The Reorganization Act also stipulated that within
five days from the submission of each plan, the legislative
bodies would meet as a Committee of the Whole, separately,
to analyze the reorganization plans before them, as well as
the Report of the Joint Commission on the same plan. In
these sessions, there would be amendments to the plan by
either House; and, if approved by the Committee of the
Whole of each House, it would be sent to the Joint
Commission which would render a final report to be
submitted for a vote in each legislative body. Within
seven days of receiving the amended plan, the Joint
Commission would adopt a final report that would be
submitted to the House and Senate for its approval by roll
call and without any amendments. Once approved by both
bodies, the plan would be sent to the Governor for his
review and signature or veto. Nevertheless, argues
Santana-Rabell
,
although this procedure tends to safeguard
the constitutional balance and allows for participation by
the minority in the Legislature, it fails to include other
sectors of the community.
Another change was the exclusion of the public
corporations from the structural reform. This means,
states Santana-Rabell, that "the most powerful, complex and
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important sector of the public administration will not be
included in the process of reorganization" (p. 157).
One element of similarity between the Reorganization
Act of 1993 and the Reorganization Act of 1949 is the
emphasis on efficiency, responsiveness, and executive
leadership. This reflects a continuity in the application
of the managerial prescription of executive leadership as a
principle of executive organization.
The notion of executive leadership is provided in
Article 3 of the Reorganization Act. This article assigns
the governor the responsibility of assessing the
organization of the executive branch and determining the
changes necessary for a good government. In section 4, the
Act enables the Governor, through the creation of
reorganization plans, to transfer, create, abolish, and
consolidate totally or partially agencies of the executive
branch. Thus, the Reorganization Act vests in the Governor
the role of Chief Executive and defines reorganization
planning as an executive function.
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Scope of the Reoraani?.atinr
Under the provisions of the Reorganization Act,
Governor Rosello took initiative over the reorganization of
the executive branch. The proposed reorganization focused
on how to reform the structure. He submitted 11
reorganization plans to the Legislature, which provided the
scope and purpose of the reorganization. As in the Rowe
Commission, these plans responded to the premise that, in
order to attain government efficiency and sound management,
the executive branch should be reduced to a small number of
departments. Here lies an application of Gulick's
principle that all agencies should be consolidated under a
single chief executive. The purpose of the plans was quite
similar to that of the plans under the reorganzat ion of
1949: to increase the effectiveness of the management of
government programs and agencies.
The reorganization plans embody the traditional
approach of umbrella departments. As Govenor Rosello says,
under each umbrella department will be grouped multiple
agencies with similar characteristics ( Nuevo Dia , August 2,
1993) . This approach advocates for the consolidation of
administrative agencies with similar functional natures
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under the same major department. The rationale of this
approach, says Fain (1987), is that each department will
have important new functions, expanded missions,
streamlined authorities, and strengthened internal
organization and management
.
The composition of the new departments, briefly
described below, evidences the reorganization's adoption of
the traditional-managerial emphasis on executive
centralization
.
Commission of Public Security and Protection
In addition to absorbing the Department of Police, the
Fire Department and the central Agency of Civil Defense of
Puerto Rico, the Commission of Public Security and
Protection would acquire important components from Health
and Natural resources. From Health it would transfer the
Auxiliary Secretariat of Medical Emergencies (including its
budget, personnel, resources and equipment) to the Fire
Department. From Natural resources it would transfer the
Planning Program for Mitigating Natural Risks. The
Commission on Public Security and Protection will be headed
by a Commissioner to be appointed by the Governor among the
Chief of the Fire Department, the Director of the Central
Agency of Civil Defense, and the Superintendent of the
Police Department. Each will be directly responsible to
the Commissioner (Reorganization Plan no. 1; Executive
Order-1994-56 ) .
Department of Justice
The Department of Justice would receive the Institute
of Forensic Sciences to provide technical and scientific
support in carrying out criminal investigations. It would
abolish the Board of Directors of the Institute and
transfer its functions to the Secretary of Justice. The
Department of Justice would also transfer to the Department
of State the Real State Examination Board, including its
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resources and personnel. In addition, it would include thefollowing components: Board of Forfeitures, the offices of
the Assistant Secretary for Human Resources,
Administration, Registration of Property, Family and
Children Affairs, Crime, Comptroller Affairs, Dispute,
Counsel, and Attorney General; the Bureau of Special
Investigations, the Executive Board SIJC, the Commission of
Civil Rights, and the System of Information on Criminal
Justice. Each of these agencies would directly responsible
to the Secretary of Justice (Reorganization Plan no. 2;
Nuevo Dia
. September 12, 1993).
Department of Correction and Rehabilitation
The Department of Correction and Rehabilitation
absorbs the Correctional Penal System, created in 1988,
Juvenile Institutions and the Corporation of Training
Businesses. The Directors of these agencies will be
directly responsible to the Secretary of Rehabilitation and
Correction (Reorganization Plan no . 3 , approved, December 3,
1993 ) .
Department of Natural and Environmental Resources
The Department of Natural and Environmental Resources
will be composed of six main agencies: thg Administration
of Natural Resources, which includes all existing programs
of the Department of Natural Resources and integrates the
Office of the Commissioner on Navigation, the Board of
Guards of Natural Resources of Puerto Rico; the Department
of Solid Waste (the Board of Directors is abolished and its
functions transferred to the Secretary) ; the Administration
of Energy Affairs; the Advisory Council on Energy, and the
Advisory Council on Natural and Environmental Resources
(Reorganization Plan no. 4, approved December 9, 1993).
Department of Agriculture
The Department of Agriculture will be composed of the
following agencies: the Administration for Farming
Services and Development of Puerto Rico (created by Article
5 of Reorganization Plan no. 5); transfer the
Administration of Agrarian Development; the Authority of
Soil; the Corporation of Agricultural Insurance; and the
Corporation for Rural Development. These components will
respond directly to the Secretary of Agriculture
(Reorganization Plan no. 5).
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Department of labor and Human Resources
The Department of Labor and Human Resources would be
organized around the following main agencies: the
Administration of Labor Rights, Board of Volunteers to theService of Puerto Rico, the Board on Minimum Wage, and the
existing programs of the Department. The activities
performed by these public organisms will be coordinated by
the Secretary of Labor and Human Resources (Reorganization
Plan no. 6, approved, May 4, 1994) .
Department of Citizens' Rights
The Department of Citizens' Rights would absorb
components from the Office of the Governor. Transfers
include the Commission of Women's Affairs, the Office of
Youth Affairs, the Office of People with Disabilities
Affairs and the Office of the Attorney for Veteran Affairs.
These agencies will be subordinate to the Secretary of
Citizens' Rights in the development of public policy and
coordination of operations (Reorganization Plan no . 7 ,
approved, February, 1994; Executive Order-1994-23;
Executive Order-1994-12).
Department of Finance
The Department of Finance continues as the Office of
the Commissioner of Financial Institutions and the Office
of the Commissioner of Insurance. Transfers include the
powers, personnel, equipment, records, and budget of the
Office of the Inspector of Cooperatives to the Office of
Commissioner of Financial Institutions; the Office of the
Inspector of Cooperatives and its functions not related to
the savings, credit and insurance Cooperatives to the
Administration of Cooperative Development; the Corporation
of Insurance to Actions and Deposits of the Cooperative of
Saving and Credit; the Administration of the Equine
Industry and Sport; and the Office of Industrial Tax
Exemption (Reorganization Plan no. 8, approved, June 2,
1994)
.
Department of Economic Development and Commerce
The Department of Economic Development and Commerce
would absorb the following departments and agencies: the
Department of Tourism, the Administration of Commercial
Development (functions related to the establishment and
development of small businesses, and promotion of foreign
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commerce and exports), the Administration of Economic
Development, the Corporation of the Development of theMovie Industry of Puerto Rico, the Administration of theEquine Industry and Sport. In addition, it would createthe Committee on Economic Development to be composed of theSecretary and the Chiefs of the different agencies. The
Directors of these agencies will be directly responsible tothe Secretary (Reorganization Plan no
. 9 , approved, June 22,19 94 ) .
Department of Family
In addition to absorbing the Department of Social
Services, created in 1968, the Department of Family
integrates the following agencies: the Administration of
Family and Children, the Administration of Social-Economic
Development and the Administration of Vocational
Rehabilitation. Transfers include the Office of Child
Services and Criminal Development (SENDES) to the
Administration of Families and Children, the Loiza
Institute for Blind Children and Youth, and the Program of
Shoe Distribution to the Department of Education
(Reorganization Plan no. 11, approved, March 23, 1995 ;
Nuevo Dia
,
April 1, 1995; Nuevo Pi a . April 6, 1994) .
The reorganization plans summarized above reflect
themes that were present in the Rowe Report. Recurrent
themes include that the reduction of the number of
agencies, organization of departments around broad goals,
and grouping of administrative agencies with related
functional natures together in one major department. The
basic assumption is that this arrangement would preclude
interagency competition and integrate functions
effectively
.
Through the reorganization plans, the proposed
reorganization unmistakably employs the managerial
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perspective's prescription of organization by
consolidation. It adopted the assumption that effective
organizational design is assured by consolidating agencies
with similar functions under the same major department.
But the important point is that this approach is not
innovative since it reflects the same approach applied by
the President's Committee on Administrative Management,
which based the organizational structure of the executive
branch of the Government of the United States on the
process involved or the type of work to be performed.
With organization by consolidation, the reorganization
proposed by Governor Rosello anticipated the benefit of
less confusion and duplication when related programs are
placed in two or more agencies. For example, in the case
of the proposed Department of Finance, it was determined
that the Office of Tax Exemption and the Administration of
Equine Industry and Sport would not be placed under this
department because of incompatibility with the functions
and goals of the Department of Finance ( Nuevo Dia . May 27,
1994)
.
It can be inferred that through the mechanism of
consolidation of agencies of similar functional natures
under one major department, the proposed reorganization
aimed at strengthening the capacity of the Governor to
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manage the multiple programs carried out by the executive
branch
.
The interest in consolidating agencies by functional
nature responded to the interest in enhancing executive
accountability through a strengthened top-level management
structure based on the traditional principle of one single
executive for each department and a sole chief executive.
In this way, the variety of programs that were administered
by several agencies became under the control of the
Governor. This reflected the tendency toward the creation
of an integrated executive, as prescribed by the managerial
perspective
.
The rationale of the proposed reorganization by
consolidation is that the Government should be organized
according to each department's major goal (basic mission).
Similarity in functional nature is the controlling
criterion. The implication is not necessarily that the
department would be big in size; the size would depend on
the broad mission and the consolidated number of agencies.
For example, the Department of Citizens' Rights is given
the broad mission of protecting the rights and interests of
a certain sectors, such as women, veterans, handicapped,
and youth. Although each agency attends to a different
clientele, they were accorded the same purpose.
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This shows a connection with President Nixon's
reorganization proposal in 1971. As Alan L. Dean (1981)
has stated, "President Nixon attempted to restructure the
executive branch along major purpose lines when he proposed
the abolition of seven domestic departments and their
regrouping into four departments concerned with community
development, human resources, natural resources, and
economic affairs" (p.136). Nixon's executive
reorganization emphasized reassembling the executive branch
on the bases of similarity of functions. In a presidential
message to Congress, he presented this approach to
organization: "The key to a new understanding is the
concept that the executive branch of the Government should
be organized around basic goals" (quoted in Fain, 1987,
P • 15 ) .
Through the reorganization plans the proposed
reorganization was also justified in terms of efficiency in
the discharge of public services and decentralization of
executive activities. As stated in the Reorganization Act
of 1993, one of the objectives of the reorganization is "to
improve the level of effectiveness and efficiency of the
government" (p.l). Governor Rosello envisioned
decentralization of executive activities by delegating
authority to the Secretaries and charging them with larger
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complex functions as a result of the consolidation of
agencies. This managerial approach carried the assumption
that strengthening departmental management would produce a
more systematic and coherent administration. Nevertheless,
decentralization might not always produce the expected
results. As Fain asserted, "Experience suggests that there
are many pitfalls in the path to effective
decentralization. Without field officers who are properly
selected, well -trained, thoroughly conversant with
departmental affairs, and prepared to assert their
delegated authority in full measure, decentralization may
not mean much" (p.22)
.
It is important to note that this reorganization is
not immune to contradictions. One contradiction arises
from the fact that the size of the government is increasing
despite the stated purpose of reducing its size. This is
confirmed by Representative Anibal Acevedo, who conducted
an analysis of the proposals to consolidate government
agencies under major departments. He argued that the
Office of the Governor has grown between 1993 and 1995. On
the one hand, states Acevedo, the Governor proposes to
transfer certain agencies located in the Office of the
Governor to the new Department of Citizens' Rights. On the
other hand, he creates three new offices: the Office of
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Communications, the Secretariat of Organization and
Governmental Politics, and the Secretariat of Strategic
development ( Nuevo—Dia, February 21, 1995) . Santana-Rabell
agrees with Acevedo in stating that the Umbrella
Departments create an additional hierarchical level since
the agencies transferred to these departments keep their
own boss. This is a contradiction with the intention of
reducing the bureaucratic structure. The basic implication
is that comprehensive accountability of government agencies
is, as Wilson (1989) states, impossible in any enduring
way
. What is possible is to make them alert to the
administration's preferences by placing loyal and competent
subordinates in charge of making decisions. This lead us
to consider the effect of this reorganization on the
legitimacy of the administrative state.
The Rosello reorganization did not attempt to identify
or address the problem of illegitimacy of the
administrative state. There was a clear intention to
institutionalize an absolute subordination of the public
bureaucracy to the Governor. According to the Director of
the Office of Management and Budget, the main purpose of
the reorganization was "to focus on the integration and
design of a structure within the executive branch which
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would create new departments directly responsible to the
governor" ( Nuevo Dia . August 2, 1993).
This statement provides continuity to the emphasis on
strict accountability by administrative agencies to the
Governor expressed in the Rowe Report
. The structural
arrangement it presupposes is proposed in the name of
e ffi c i®ncy. This, however, reflects an exclusive focus on
the relation of management to the organization of
administrative institutions and the role of the Governor as
manager. The managerial perspective's proposition of
executive supremacy over administration and its consequence
of an instrumental character of the public administration
is thus identifiable in this reorganization.
The proposed reorganization, with its emphasis on
consolidation, anticipates a greater executive oversight
over the executive branch. This view reflects the
managerial doctrine embodied in the Rowe Report that
presupposes an inseparability of good administration and
executive leadership. The reorganization reaffirms the
Rowe Report's emphasis on establishing a strong executive
with substantial authority over the executive branch and
responsibility for administrative management. Therefore,
the reorganization not only enhances the position of the
no
Governor as Chief Executive, but also perpetuates his role
as manager of the executive branch.
Ill
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS
The emergence of the notion of a strong executive in
Puerto Rico is based on a direct association with two
theoretical arguments that embody the view of executive
leadership of both the Founders and the managerial
perspective. These theories, and their practical
application in the context of the United States, guided the
development of a strong executive in Puerto Rico. The
Hamiltonian chief executive characterized by unity and
energy was the vision of the Founders. The innovative
aspect of the Puerto Rican executive was to combine this
vision with the practical experience in the United States
with a weak executive in order to legitimize a strong
executive. The managerial perspective contributed the idea
that governmental efficiency depended on the centralization
of substantial authority in the chief executive as center of
direction and administrative management.
The direct application of these theoretical
perspectives to the effort to reorganize the executive
branch of the Government of Puerto Rico in 1949 contributed
to this effort's success in bringing significant change to
the island's political and administrative systems. On the
political side, the Governor became the embodiment of
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political legitimacy 1 and executive leadership. The central
point here is that this application healed a long-lasting
defect in the systems of separation of powers established by
the Jones Act in 1917. it put an end to legislative
dominance over administration. As a result, the Executive
acquired a balance with the legislature with regard to his
relation with the public bureaucracy. Considering the
nature of the subordination of the executive branch to the
legislature before 1949 in Puerto Rico, Governor Munoz-Marin
was right in initiating a comprehensive reorganization to
strengthen the role of the Governor as Chief Executive.
Besides their political impact, these theoretical
perspectives oriented the evolution of the administrative
state in Puerto Rico. The emphasis on strict executive
centralization dominated the organization of administrative
institutions. The main feature, product of the managerial
perspective, was a strictly hierarchical structure of
authority with the Governor at the top. A level of
accountability to the Governor, and not only to the
The term political legitimacy, in this sense, refers to the
significant change in the selection of the Governor of Puerto Rico
from presidential appointment to popular election. As stated
before, the Governorship in Puerto Rico was the embodiment of
political illegitimacy since the executive was a North American,
appointed by the President with the consent and approval of the
Senate, unrepresentative of the interests and concerns of the
people of Puerto Rico. Hence, the political legitimacy of the
Governorship in Puerto Rico originated in the popular election of
the Governor.
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legislature, was instituted. This arrangement followed the
thrust that strict centralization and a narrow span of
control would give direction and ensure accountability
within the executive branch.
Although both the Founders
' and the managerial
perspective's emphasis on executive organization were
applied to the practice of reorganization planning in Puerto
Rico, the managerial perspective was more influential in
determining the character of the Governor as Chief
Executive. Reorganization planning under Governor Munoz-
Marin subsumed the modern, managerial presidency perspective
with its strong emphasis on the chief executive's
administrative supremacy. Thus, this perspective was an
integral part of the development of the concept of an
enhanced managerial governorship.
The Rowe Commission, in this regard, indicated the
importance of this perspective as a discourse which is
explicitly concerned with executive leadership. The
Commission called for an exclusive gubernatorial control of
executive reorganization and argued for the unification of
the executive power under the managerial control of the
Governor as strategies to achieve executive supremacy in
Puerto Rico. This expressed an adoption of the Brownlow
Committee's emphasis on the necessity for a strong
managerial executive, which led to an expansion of the
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expectations of gubernatorial responsibility to include the
management of the administrative agencies.
This emphasis on gubernatorial management was
reaffirmed in the reorganization of the executive branch
initiated by Governor Rosello in 1993. Although the Rosello
Administration did not produce a report, its reorganization
plans served as the documentary source for the continuity of
the emphasis on executive centralization.
The critical analysis of these reorganizations relied
on the fact that while the Rowe Commission created the
problem of illegitimacy of the administrative state", the
Rosello reorganization perpetuated it. The Rowe Report set
a basis for the illegitimacy of the administrative state
based on strict accountability of government agencies to the
Governor. This was a considerable consequence of the
application of the managerial perspective to the case of
reorganization of the executive branch. In adopting this
perspective's dominant principles of organization, the
report incorporated into the Puerto Rican administrative
system the instrumental view of Public Administration. One
can argue that the members of the Rowe commission were aware
of this implication. The fact that Louis Brownlow and James
The term illegitimacy with regard to the administrative state
refers to the view, grounded on orthodox bases, that administrative
agencies are instruments of a strengthened executive rather than
institutions of government.
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H. Rowe, two advocates of the managerial perspective, had
considerable influence in the work of the commission
supports the contention that the Rowe Commission's intention
was precisely to make the public bureaucracy subject to
absolute subordination to the Governor as Chief Executive.
The Rosello reorganization, like previous
reorganizations, makes no effort to identify this problem of
illegitimacy and offers no solution. In fact, it justifies
strict subordination of administrative agencies to executive
authority in the Governor, through the establishment of the
umbrella departments with direct accountability to the
Governor. Thus, the Rosello reorganization, while enhancing
the managerial role of the Governor, contributes to develop,
as in the case of the Rowe Commission, an illegitimacy of
the administrative institutions that confines these
institutions to mere instruments of passive implementation
or execution of the laws.
I believe that a managerial governorship is appropriate
for the effective coordination of executive agencies. It
gives the Governor greater opportunity to establish
managerial cohesion within the executive branch and ensure
the faithful execution of the laws. However, its emphasis
on control and strict subordination of administrative
agencies to the chief executive ignores the political nature
of the Public Administration. The exercise of absolute
116
control of executive activities is not consistent with
democratic values since it hinders the formal virtue of
public administrators to contribute to governance. The
managerial perspective carries a language that delegitimates
the administrative state in terms of reducing its role to an
instrument of a strengthened executive. The experience of
executive reorganization in Puerto Rico, based on the
principles of organization prescribed by the managerial
perspective, has accorded the public administration this
instrumental character.
The history of executive reorganizations in Puerto Rico
does not speak of administrative agencies as institutions of
government. Administrative agencies have been considered, in
great measure, instruments of the Chief Executive. In both
the Rowe Report and the reorganization plans of the Rosello
Administration resides a discourse that puts exclusive
attention on the role of management in executive
organization and not on the role of public administration in
governance. Focusing on how to organize the executive
agencies so that they become more responsible and directly
accountable to the Governor, this discourse has ignored the
importance of the doctrine of an energetic administration in
the execution of the laws. This is the importance that the
Founders accorded to administration. This ignorance
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produces a lack of sense of legitimacy of the role effective
administration plays in governance.
The executive branch in Puerto Rico should entail an
innovative dimension that introduces a new political and
administrative discourse in which the Public Administration
is viewed as a collaborative partner in the process of
governance. Here I follow the normative emphasis of the
legitimacy perspective, which recognizes the Public
Administration as an institution of government rather than
an instrument of the Chief Executive.
To introduce a new discourse that will enhance the role
of public administration in governance will start the
tendency to legitimate the administrative state in Puerto
Rico. The first step is to produce a shift in the prevalent
discourse in order to emphasize the function of
administrative agencies as government institutions rather
than to put exclusive attention on their organization. This
will produce a change in the character of public
administration in Puerto Rico.
When I say to legitimize the administrative state, I do
not mean to abandon the traditional emphasis on
gubernatorial leadership in administration. What I mean by
legitimating the administrative state is to recognize, on
constitutional grounds, the role of public administration in
governance. This is to acknowledge the distinctive nature
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of public administration. As Warr.sley et al state, "The
distinctive nature of the Public
-Administration lies in the
fact that it is part of the governance process, that it is
in a political context and competence directed toward the
public interest" (p. 39). This acknowledgement implies a
re-conceptualization of government agencies as instruments
of action in pursuit of the public interest.
This emphasis on legitimacy does not attempt to change
the subordinate status of the Public Administration. As
Rohr (1985) asserts, "The Public Administration neither
constitutes nor heads any branch of government, but is
subordinate to all three of them" (p.182) . "In dealing with
its constitutionally derived ambiguity and discretion"
,
says
Wamsley et al
. ,
"the Public Administration must always act
within the constraints imposed by its origin in covenant, a
covenant manifested in the Constitution..." (p.45).
A second step is to recognize the importance of the
formal virtue of public administrators as actors in the
process of governance. This virtue presupposes that public
administrators have a right to choose among constitutional
superiors when disagreements in policy arise. This means
that they may have to be responsive to the Governor at one
point, to the Legislature at another, or to the courts at
other times. The central point is that public
administrators "should certainly use their discretion to
119
favor those policies that they think are likely to promote
the public interest" (Rohr, p. 183), and not only those
expressed by the Governor. This will enable them to view
the authority of their own institutions as legitimate. More
importantly, it is to recognize that in the virtue of pubic
officials resides an opportunity to shape events, so that
government becomes more responsive to the people's will
embedded in the constitution rather than to immediate
pressures
.
A third step to form the new discourse is to adopt the
concept of public interest as the appropriate normative
basis for public administrators. Pendleton Herring defines
this concept as "the standard that guides the administrator
in executing the law" (quoted in Goodsell, 1993). In
executing the laws, public administrators should use their
discretion to discover the public interest in the midst of
conflicting demands and clashing interests. This is, as
Wamsley et al . state, "to play the long-term public interest
rather than the most immediate and powerful pressures"
(p.48). In essence, legitimating the administrative state
is vesting in it the ultimate responsibility to be
responsive to the constitutional order and the democratic
governance process
.
The analysis of the Founders', the managerial, and
legitimacy perspectives helps us understand the practice of
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reorganization planning in Puerto Rico and its contributions
in creating a strong executive. But this analysis also
indicates that, in order to address the issue of
illegitimacy of the administrative state, we have to turn to
the emphasis of the legitimacy perspective. This promises a
new discourse that will accord the public administration in
Puerto Rico not only a distinctive character but also its
place in the democratic governance process.
121
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Arnold, P. (1986)
New Jersey:
Making the Managerial PrpdHpnry
Princeton University Press
Caldwell, L. ( 1944 )
Jefferson and
Chicago Press.
—
—Administrative Theories
Hamilton
.
Chicago: University
of
of
Ceaser, J.W. (1979)
.
Development
.
New
Presidentia l Se lection: Theory .nH
Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Corwin, E
. S
.
( 1984 )
.
1887—1984
.
New
The President: Of fice and Pnwprc,
York: New York University Press.
DiClerico, R.E. (1979). The American Presidency
Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc.
New
Dimock, M.E. (1951). The Reorganizatio n of the Executive
—
ranch
- San Juan: University of Puerto Rico Press.
Eastland, T. (1992). Ene rgy in the Executive: th^
for the Strong Presidency. New York: The Free Press.
Emmerich, H. (1971). Federa l Reorganization and
Administrative Management. Alabama: The University ofAlabama Press.
Fain, T.G. (comp.) (1987). Federal Reorganization: The
Executive
—
Branch
.
New York: R.R. Bowker Company.
Fry, B.R. (1989) . Mastering Public Administration: From
—ffieber—to—Dw i g h t Waldo . New Jersey: Chatham House
Publishers, Inc.
Goodsell
,
C.T. (1975). Administration of a Revolution:
Executive Reform in Puerto Rico under Governor
Tugwell
,
—
1941-194 6 . Massachusetts: Harvard University
Press
.
Gulick, L. (1937). Notes on the Theory of Organization.
Institute of Public Administration, Columbia
University, New York.
Hess, S. (1988). Organizing the Presidency. Washington,
D.C., Broking Institution.
122
Hoover Commission (1949) . Report on OrnanWstion of
Executive Branch of Government New York: Me Graw 'Hill.
Kallenback, J.E. (1966). The American Chief Rxeniti vp-
-
^ e—
P
residency and the Governorship. New York:
Harper & Row Publishers.
Karl, B.D. (1963). Executive Reorganization and Reform in
t he New Deal. Harvard University Press.
Kramer, F. (1987) . "Changing Public Bureucracy: Values
and Organization - Management Theories. A CenteniaT
History
.
o f th e American Administrative State , edited
by Ralph Clark. New York: The Free Press.
Lowi, T.J. (1985). The Personal President: Power
Invested, Promise Unfulfilled. Ithaca, New York:
Cornell University Press.
Moe, R.C. (1982). The Hoover Commissions Revisited.
Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.
Moe, R.C.
,
& Gilmour, S.R. (1995) . "Rediscovering
Principles of Public Administration: the Neglected
Foundation of Law"
. Public Administration Review .
Vol
. 55, Number 2, March-April, pp . 135-146.
Nathan, R.P. (1983). The Administrative Presidency. New
York: John Wiley & Sons.
Notes on the Debates of the Federal Convention of 1787.
New York: Norton & Company.
Ramos de Santiago. C. (1965)
.
El Gobiernor de Puerto Rico.
Rio Piedras: University of Puerto Rico Press.
Report of the President's Committee on Adminit rative
Management
.
(1937). Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office.
Report of the Commission on Reorganization of the Executive
Branch of the Government of Puerto Rico. (1949).
123
New
Rossiter, C.
Edition
.
(1960) * The Ame rican President
New York: Harcot, Brace & World
Second
, Inc
.
- (Ed. ) . (1961) .
New American Lib
The FedPr^l-iQ t P^pP r g
rary
.
Santana-Raben. L. (1993). Fulcor v iw a dsnr1 afldministranon Publlc a Puert-n R^ n:
Eeforma
^
Revlsta de Administracion Publlca, Vol.(special edition)
. Graduate School of PublicAdministration. Rio Piedras, Puerto Rico.
la
25
Seidman, H
.
,
Power
.
& Gilmour, R.
Oxford: Oxford
(1986 )- Politics. Position AnH
University Press.
Thach, C.C. (1923)
.
1389. Baltimor:
Pho—Creation of the Presidency: 177 5-
John Hopkins Press.
U. S. Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch(Hoover Commission)
.
(1949). Report on Organ
of the Executive Branch of Government
.
New York-
McGraw Hill.
on
— • 8 •
—President ' s—Commi ttee on Administrative
Management, (The President's Committee Report).
(1937). Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office.
Waldo, D. (1984) . The Administrative State: A Study of the
Poli tical Philosophy of American Public
Administration
.
Second Edition. New York: Holmes
& Meir Publishers.
Wamsley, G.L. et al. (1990). Public Administration and
the Governance Process: Shifting the Political
Dialogue. Refounding Public Administration.
California: Sage Publications.
White, L.D. (1948). The Federalists: A Study in
Administrative History. New York: The Macmillan
Company
.
Wilson, J.Q. (1989). Bureaucracy: What Government
Agencies Do and Why They Do It. Basic Books.
124
Government Documents
Reorganization Act 140, 1949
Reorganization Act of 1993
The Office of the Governor.
Legislature of Puerto Rico.
1993
1993
" *
1993.
1993.
1993
1994
1994
1994
1994
1995
Newspaper Articles
Acevedo, A. (1995^ February
Reorganization Gubernamental
Executive Order-1994-56.
Executive Order-1994-23.
Executive Order-1994-12.
Reorganization Plan no. 1,
Reorganization Plan no. 2,
Reorganziation Plan no. 3,
Reorganization Plan no. 4,
Reorganization Plan no. 5,
Reorganization Plan no. 6,
Reorganization Plan no. 7,
Reorganization Plan no. 8,
Reorganization Plan no. 9,
Reorganization Plan no. 11,
21)
.
"Presupuesto y
". El Nuevo Dia
, p. 47.
125
'Vital el consenso para
El Nuevo ni^
r p.5.
Carrasco, 0. (1993, February 1)
reorganizar el gobierno"
.
El Nuevo Dia
. January 7, 1993
April 1, 1995.
April 6, 1994.
May 27, 1994.
August 2, 1993.
August 22, 1993.
• September 12, 1993.
El Mundo. March 25, 1949.
March 18, 1949.
February 18, 1949.
o'
126

